Phase 5

The Central Roman Campaign

  In early spring 217 BC, Hannibal decided to advance south, leaving his wavering Gallic allies in the Po Valley and crossing the Apennines unopposed. Afterwards, he avoided the Roman positions and took the only unguarded route into Etruria at the mouth of the Arno.

Location of the Arno River

  This route was through a huge marsh, which happened to be more flooded than usual for spring. Hannibal's army marched for several days without finding convenient places to rest, suffering terribly from fatigue and lack of sleep.

Marsh in the Arno River

This area was practically one huge marsh, and happened to be overflowing more than usual during this particular season. Hannibal knew that this route was full of difficulties, but it remained the surest and certainly the quickest way to central Italy. Polybius claims Hannibal's men marched for four days and three nights, "through a land that was under water", suffering terribly from fatigue and enforced want of sleep. He crossed the Apennines (during which he lost his right eye (John Selby Watson; Marcus Junianus; Justinus, Cornelius; Nepos, Eutropius (1853) because of conjunctivitis) and crossed the seemingly impassable Arno without opposition, but in the marshy lowlands of the Arno, he lost a large part of his force (Polybius, Histories, Book III, p74)  in the marsh of that river.

   Arriving in Etruria in the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to lure the main Roman army under Flaminius, into a pitched battle, by devastating the region Flaminius had been sent to protect. Polybius wrote that Hannibal calculated that he could draw out Flaminius into battle and that "no sooner had he left the neighborhood of Faesulae, and, advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp, made a raid upon the neighboring country, then Flaminius became excited, and enraged at the idea that he was being taunted by the enemy: and as the devastation of the country went on, and he saw from the smoke that rose in every direction that the work of destruction was proceeding, he could not patiently endure the sight”(Polybius, The Histories, 3.82).  Flaminius remained passively encamped at about 10 miles north of Lake Trasimene at Arretium.

Lake Trasimene Battlefield

 Unable to goad Flaminius into battle, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome, providing the earliest record of a deliberate turning movement in military history.  Military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge describes the significance of this maneuver and its intended effects on the campaign:

“We are told nothing about it by the ancient authors, whose knowledge of war confined them solely to the description of battles. However, it is apparent enough to us […] by this handsome march Hannibal cut Flaminius off from Rome …, as he was apt to move by the flank past the Roman camp [so as] to taunt the Roman general. Here is shown …the clear conception of the enemy’s strategic flank, neither with all its advantages […] nor by his maneuver had Hannibal recklessly cut himself loose from his base, though he was living on the country and independent of it, as it were; the fact is, that the complete integrity of his line of communication … was preserved. A perfect case of cutting the enemy from his communications can more scarcely be conceived. . . . If he [Flaminius] fought, it must be under morally and materially worse conditions than if his line was open; and the effect on his men of having the enemy between them and Rome . . . could not but be disastrous.”

  Still, Flaminius stubbornly kept his army in camp. Hannibal decided to march on towards Apulia, hoping that Flaminius might follow him to a battlefield of his own choosing (Polybius, The Histories, 3.81–3, Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.4)

  Flaminius, eager to exact revenge for the devastation of the countryside, and facing increasing political criticism from Rome, finally marched against Hannibal. Gaius Flaminius, like Tiberius Sempronius Longus, was impetuous, overconfident, and lacking in self-control (Polybius, The Histories, 3.80).  His advisors suggested that he send only a cavalry detachment to harass the Carthaginians and prevent them from laying waste to any more of the country, while reserving his main force until the other consul, Servilius, arrived with his army. However, it proved impossible to argue with the rash Flaminius. Livy wrote, "Though every other person in the council advised safe rather than showy measures, urging that he should wait for his colleague, in order that joining their armies, they might carry on the war with united courage and counsels... Flaminius, in a fury... gave out the signal for marching to battle” (Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.3).

  As Hannibal passed Lake Trasimene, he came to a place very suitable for an ambush and hearing that Flaminius had broken camp and was pursuing him, made preparations for the impending battle. To the north was a series of heavily forested hills where the Malpasso Road passed along the north side of Lake Trasimene. Along the hill-bordered skirts of the lake, Hannibal camped where he was in full view of anyone entering the northern defile, and spent the night arranging his troops for battle. Below the camp, he placed his heavy infantry (Iberians, Celts and Africans) upon a slight elevation. Here, they had ample ground from which they could charge down upon the head of the Roman column on the left flank, when it should reach this position (Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.4, Polybius, The Histories, 3.83.). His cavalry and Gallic infantry were concealed in the hills in the depth of the wooded valley from which the Romans would first enter, so that they could quickly sally out and close the entrance, blocking the Roman route of retreat. Then he posted his light troops at intervals along the heights overlooking the plain, with orders to keep well hidden in the woods until signaled to attack. In addition, the night before the battle commenced, Hannibal ordered his men to light campfires on the hills of Tuoro, at a considerable distance, to convince the Romans that his forces were further away than they actually were (Battle of Lake Trasimene, M.R. van der Werf, Ground Warfare: H-Q, 486).  Advancing through Etruria, Hannibal had provoked Gaius Flaminius into a hasty pursuit without proper reconnaissance.  Then in a defile on the shore of Lake Trasimene Hannibal lay in ambush with his whole army.  The ambush was a complete success.

  On the morning of June 21, the Roman troops marched eastward along the road running near the northern edge of the lake. Eager for battle, Flaminius pushed his men hard and hurried up the column in the rear. Hannibal then sent a small skirmish force to draw the vanguard away from the front of the line, in order to split the Roman forces. Once all the Romans had at last marched through the foggy, narrow defile and entered the plains skirting the lake, trumpets sounded, signaling the general attack.

  The Carthaginian cavalry and infantry swept down from their concealed positions in the surrounding hills, blocked the road and engaged the unsuspecting Romans from three sides. Surprised and outmaneuvered, the Romans did not have time to draw up in battle array, and had to fight a desperate hand-to-hand battle in open order. The Romans were divided quickly into three parts. The Roman cavalry was pushed into the lake, leaving the other two groups with no way to retreat. In the centre, including Flaminius, the Romans stood their ground. However, they were cut down by Hannibal’s Gauls after three hours of heavy combat.  

The Battle of Lake Trasimene

In less than four hours, the Roman army was annihilated. The vanguard saw little combat and, once the disaster to their rear became obvious, some fought their way through the skirmishers and out of the forest. Of the initial Roman force of about 30,000, about 15,000 were either killed in battle or drowned while trying to escape into the lake — including Flaminius himself, who was killed by the Gaul Ducarius. Another 10,000 are reported to have made their way back to Rome by various means, and the rest were captured (Polybius, The Histories, 3.84, Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.6-7 (who for the casualty figure cites Quintus Fabius Pictor, a historian who fought in and wrote on the Second Punic War). Hannibal's losses were 2,500, plus "many" who died of their wounds (Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.7)  About 6,000 Romans escaped, under the cover of fog, only to be captured by Maharbal,  Hannibal’s Calvary Commander, the following day. Both Livy and Polybius wrote that Maharbal promised safe passage ("with a garment apiece") if they surrendered their weapons and amour, but Hannibal had them sold into slavery irrespective of the promise made (Polybius, The Histories, 3.84-5, this was a common custom on both sides).  The disaster for Rome did not end there. Furthermore Cornelius Scipio, aware of this battle sent his cavalry within a day or two, as a reinforcement force of 4,000 under the propraetor (or a proconsul who acted in place of a Consul) Gaius Centenius which was intercepted and destroyed (Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.8; Polybius).

   Hannibal, emerging from another brilliant victory, had successfully planned and executed the greatest ambush in history (Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy).   Dodge writes, “It is the only instance in history of lying in ambush with the whole of a large army.” Similarly, historian Robert L. O'Connell also writes, “[It was] the only time an entire large army was effectively swallowed and destroyed by such a maneuver.”

Hannibal

  Because of this victory, they had more military booty than they could handle, so the surplus was sold to Egyptian traders, to be sold it back to the Romans.  Like all previous engagements prisoners had propaganda value, they were sorted out between Romans and non-Romans.  The Romans remained captured, while the non-Romans were released to spread the news that the Carthaginian armies were in Italy to fight for their freedom from the Romans.  However, Hannibal did not attack Rome, instead he marched south with the hopes of gaining allies from the Greek and Italian population in that part of Italy.  Nevertheless, things did not go similar to the successes he had among the Gallic tribes of northern Italy.  No doubt while Hannibal was in the region of Latium where they city Rome lay he sent probes into the area to see how well it was defended but he would take not further actions on this objective.  Rome was surrounded by a wall called the Servian Wall at this time.

The City of Rome with the Servian Wall in Green

  There was panic and disorder in Rome when rumors about Trasimene spread among the city population, which were confirmed when the praetor Marcus Pomponius curtly announced in the Forum "We have been defeated in a great battle” (Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage p190).  The defeat of Lake Trasimene put the Romans in an immense state of panic, fearing for the existence of the city. The Senate met in continual session to debate the next course of action until three days later the news of the defeat of the Roman cavalry by Maharbal arrived in Rome. The Roman senate and the people, realizing the gravity of the situation, decided to elect a dictator (for the first time since 249 BCE) to direct the war effort. As one of the elected consuls was dead and the other one away with his army, a dictator was elected by the senate instead of one chosen by one of the consuls.  Quintus Fabius Maximus, a member of the patrician Fabii, who had suggested that an election should take place, was elected into office by the assembled centuries of the people, his term in office being set for the next six months. Fabius, 58 years of age, nearly 30 years older than Hannibal, at that time carried the nickname "Verrucosus" or "Spotty" because of a wart on his face. His past political record was anything but spotty; he had fought in the First Punic War, had been elected consul in 233 and 228 BCE. He was one of the elected censors in 230 BCE, and was granted a triumph for his efforts against the Ligurians. Normally a dictator chose his own deputy, the Master of Horse, but Fabius received as his Master of Horse Marcus Minucius Rufus (a plebeian who was consul in 221 BCE), in an unusual political gesture (Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage, p191).   It was suggested that the post of Fabius was that of a pro-dictator (acting dictator), but it seems Fabius enjoyed all the powers of a dictator during his term.       

  The city of Rome's history spans more than two and a half thousand years, since its legendary founding in 753 BCE. Rome is one of the oldest continuously occupied cities in Europe.  In the ancient world, it was successively the capital city of the Roman Kingdom, the Roman Republic and later the Roman Empire.

Part of the Servian Wall today

The third and second century BCE saw the establishment of the Roman hegemony over the Mediterranean and the East, through the two Punic Wars fought against the city of Carthage ((1964. Dtv-atlas zur Weltgeschichte). Then were established the first Roman provinces: Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica up to this point in time.

  From the beginning of the 2nd century BC, the power shared between two groups of aristocrats: those who claimed to be traditionalists, representing the   conservative part of the Senate, and the populares, were leaders in the late Roman Republic who relied on the people’s assemblies and tribunate to acquire political power. They are considered by modern scholarship as in opposition to the optimates, which relied on the help of the urban populace to gain the power. In the same period, the bankruptcy of the small farmers and the establishment of large slave estates provoked the migration to the city of a large number of people. The continuous warfare made necessary a professional army, which was more loyal to its chiefs than to the republic. 

  Due to that, in the second half of the second century and during the first century BCE saw fights abroad and at home.  A defensive wall that even was located on part on the Tiber River surrounded the city.  There is a chance that there was an armed camp in Rome at this time, but it is unknown how many legions were defending it.

  For some reason Hannibal avoided taking the city of Rome.  He passed right by it to the east closer to the east coast and the Adriatic than the province of Latium where Rome was located.  Latium (Latin: Latium) is the region of central western Italy in which the city of Rome was founded and grew to be the capital city of the Roman Republic. Latium was originally a small triangle of fertile, volcanic soil on which resided the tribe of the Latins (Mogens Herman Hansen (2000). “A Comparative Study of Thirty City-state Cultures: An Investigation“). It was located on the left bank (east and south) of the Tiber river, extending northward to the Anio river (a left-bank tributary of the Tiber) and southeastward to the Pomptina Palus (Pontine Marshes, now the Pontine Fields) as far south as the Circeian promontory (Cary, M.; Scullard, H. H. (1975). A History of Rome: Down to the Reign of Constantine).

    The Romans needed to prepare a proper reception should Hannibal decide to show up outside Rome with his army. Fabius first set about restoring the morale of the Roman people and then tackled the task of preparing the defenses of Rome after receiving his post. He took meticulous care in observing all the religious procedures attached to state affairs and all the civil procedures related to state administration to boost the morale of the city population, after having blamed the Trasimene disaster on the lack of proper religious observations by the dead Consul Flaminius. The senate consulted the Sibylline Books at the suggestion of Fabius and a praetor was assigned to appease the Roman gods through generous sacrifices. Divine duties taken care of, Fabius next went on and preparing for Hannibal's anticipated visit to Latium, being ignorant of his location and intention at that time.  The city walls were repaired; Minucius was put in charge of preparing a “reception committee” by raising two Roman and two allied legions and attached cavalry units to defend the city in nearby Tibur. The un-walled towns in Latium were evacuated, and their inhabitants were moved into walled towns. Certain bridges were destroyed to deny the Carthaginians easy passage through Latium.  Hannibal through his probes must have been aware of some of what the Romans were preparing for him should he attack the city.  His forces were not large enough nor had the capacity to 

throw a pitched battle in order to take Rome.  Therefore, an attack against a well-prepared defense such as Rome’s would have meant a costly battle one in which the price might be too high.  It would be better to live to fight another day when the conditions were in his favor. He was aware of the availability of his supplies and reinforcements from Iberia thanks to the army of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus.  A Carthaginian fleet appeared in the Adriatic possibly with the intention to re-supply him.  Nevertheless, when they encountered a large Roman naval force they retreated without a fight.

  It is a matter of speculation why Hannibal did not march on Rome or what might have happened had he done so immediately after Trasimene (Strategy, B.H. Liddell Hart, p. 26).I believe he wanted to make allies of all who lived in central region of the Roman Republic.  He felt that if he could create such a consensus the Roman Republic could be defeated easily.  The problem was that the central part of the Peninsula by this time was so tight with the Romans it was not possible.  All of these people felt that now they were part if the Great Roman Republic.  They had made their alliances and they kept them.  This was a miscalculation by Hannibal if that was his strategy. He was not going to gain them as allies.

    The Carthaginian army instead marched south-east into Umbria, through Perugia, although Livy refers to a failed siege of Spoletiuma Latin colony (Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War, p66)  Polybius does not mention it, and it is likely that only some Carthaginian raiders troubled the Latin colony (Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War, p66). If it is possible that these raiders were, probes sent out by Hannibal to do a reconnaissance of Rome’s defenses.  Hannibal, all the while ravaging the countryside, marched through Picenum towards the Adriatic coast, reaching Herita 10 days after leaving Lake Trasimene. Here Hannibal rested his army, which was suffering from scurvy, refitted the Libyan/African troops with captured Roman equipment and retrained them, and by using low grade local wine (acetum) as an ointment, brought the cavalry horses back to health (Cottrell, Leonard, Hannibal Enemy of Rome, p118).  With no Roman army situated near him, Hannibal was free to choose his next course of action unhindered.  

  Once it was clear that Hannibal was not marching towards Rome, Fabius ordered the army of Servilius into Latium. When Fabius left Rome he and took over command of the army near Narnia, (Polybius 3.88.3) or a few miles south at Ocriculum (Livy 22.11.5).  Then he joined the army of Minucius at Tibur and marched along the Via Appia into Apulia in southeastern Italy.

The Via Appia

   Departing from Roman military traditions, Fabius adopted the strategy named after him: avoiding open battle, while placing several Roman armies in Hannibal's vicinity in order to watch and limit his movements.  He would avoid open battle while constantly harassing his enemy’s outriders.   Having ravaged Apulia without bringing Fabius to battle, Hannibal decided to march through Samnium to Campania, one of the richest and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would draw Fabius into battle.

The Region of Apulia

Fabius closely followed Hannibal's path of destruction, yet still refused to let himself be drawn out of the defensive. This strategy was unpopular with many Romans, who believed it was a form of cowardice.  This course of action was not popular among his soldiers and they gave him the nickname "The Delayer" since he seemed to be avoiding battle while the enemy was devastating Italy.  It was widely feared that as long as Hannibal’s army ravaged and plundered the Roman countryside unopposed their terrified allies might soon plead their allegiance to Carthage rather than to Rome.