Phase 7

The Influence of the War on Other Nations

 The morale effect of this victory at Cannae was such that most of southern Italy joined Hannibal's cause. After Cannae, the Hellenistic southern provinces of Arpi, Salapia, Herdonia, Uzentum, including the cities of Capua and Tarentum (two of the largest city-states in Italy) in 216 BCE revoked their allegiance to Rome and pledged their loyalty to Hannibal. As Livy noted, "How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae than those which preceded it, can be seen by the behavior of Rome's allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman power”(Livy, 22.61.10, trans. Healy, Mark. Cannae: Hannibal Smashes Rome's Army).   In the same year in 216 BCE, the Greek cities in Sicily revolted against Roman political control, while the Macedonian king, Philip V, pledged his support to Hannibal, initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome. Hannibal also secured an alliance with the new King Hieronymus of Syracuse.

    However, in spite of the tremendous blow to the cause of Rome, Hannibal may have not believed he had the resources and personnel needed to launch a successful attack or siege against the city the size of Rome. ((Dodge, Theodore (1994). Hannibal.) He was once again uncertain of the feasibility of such an attack and he spent a long time pondering it.  Had he taken the city that would have put an end to the Rome and its power.  While he hesitated, the Romans were able to regroup and the opportunity was lost.  The Romans, of course, looked back on Hannibal’s indecision as what saved Rome from complete defeat.  Perhaps Hannibal never intended to conquer Rome itself and was thinking of another strategy.    Hannibal sent a delegation to Rome to negotiate a peace and another one offering to release his Roman prisoners of war for ransom, but Rome rejected all offers.  The policy of Rome was as long as their enemy was on their soil they would not talk of terms.  Furthermore, the Macedonian navy was no match for the Roman navy, so they were unable to help him either. 

Amphitheatre in Capua

   An important defection to Hannibal in 216 BCE was the city of Capua, the second largest city in Italy, where Hannibal made his new base.  This city could have been the rival to Rome. Before he took the city the inhabitants claimed relationship with Rome.  However, after declaring their friendship with Hannibal, the possibility of becoming the supreme city in Italy with the evident Roman disasters proved too strong a temptation.  The Capuans had no obligations to him, but provided the harbor through which Hannibal received reinforcements.  Nevertheless, what disappointed him was that not many of the centrally located Roman cities wanted to join him as allies.

  After this, Hannibal went about setting up a Carthaginian alliance in Italy. Ancient Capua was located where Santa Maria Capua Vetere is now. It was located near the eastern coast of Italy. So Hannibal had moved from west to east after the battle of Cannae.  The importance of Capua increased steadily during the 3rd century BCE, and at the beginning of the Second Punic War it was considered to be only slightly smaller than Rome and Carthage. The Capuans themselves were able to furnish 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Until after the defeat of Cannae it remained faithful to Rome. But, after a vain demand, that one of the Roman consuls should always be selected from it in order to secure regional supremacy in the event of a Carthaginian victory, it defected to Hannibal. Hannibal made this city his winter quarters. The people of Capua voluntarily received him and his army. Livy and others have suggested that the luxurious conditions were Hannibal's "Cannae" because his troops became soft and demoralized by luxurious living. Historians from Bosworth Smith onwards have been skeptical of this, observing that his troops gave as good an account of themselves in battle after that winter as before. 

  Earlier in history in 312 BCE, Capua became connected with Rome by the construction of the Via Appia, one of the most important of the military highways in Italy:

Map of the Via Appia in Ancient Italy

The gate by which it left the Servian walls of Rome bore the name Porta Capena; perhaps the only case in which a gate in this city bears the name of the place to which it led.  Therefore, it occupied a strategic position in Hannibal’s time.

Remains of Tarentum

   The city of Tarentum also came over to him around that time. Here he gained a port where he could receive supplies as well. This city was almost as big as Capua.    This caused the Romans to move their fleet from Tarentum to Brundisium. 

    After Cannae, besides Capua, the other towns of Apulia of Salapia, Arpia, Herdonia and many of the Lucanians went over to him.  However, his greatest gain was the city of Capua.  The cities if Hirpini and Claudini joined Hannibal when he marched to the north of Capua.  By 215 BCE, Hannibal’s alliance system included the bulk of southern Italy, except for some Greek cities along the coast (except for Croton, which was captured by his allies).  The independent Gaul he had established in northern Italy was still out of Roman control.  In 215 BCE, Hannibal was able to take Casuiliner, the important city for controlling Campania.  Nevertheless, the area between Campania and the Po River was nominally in Roman hands.  If Hannibal did place garrisons to control the areas he conquered as he passed from the north to the south of Italy they did not last long.  One must not forget that Rome also possessed a good navy that had been victorious in almost every battle it had with Carthage thanks to the covus.  Rome still had legions to spare so they were by no means totally defeated. The essence of Hannibal’s campaign in Italy was to fight the Romans using local resources and raising recruits from among the local population and forming alliances against the Romans. 

  After hearing of Rome's disastrous defeat at the hands of Hannibal at Cannae in 216 BCE, Philip V of Macedon had sent ambassadors to Hannibal's camp in Italy to negotiate an alliance. There they concluded it in the summer of 215 BCE a treaty, the text of which is given by Polybius. In it, they pledged in general terms, mutual support and defense and to be enemies to each other's enemies (excepting current allies). Specifically they promise support against Rome, and that Hannibal shall have the right to make peace with Rome, but that any peace would include Philip V and that Rome would be forced to give up control of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, and Atintania and "to restore to Demetrius of Pharos all those of his friends now in the dominion of Rome.

    On their way back to Macedon, Publius Valerius Flaccus captured Philip V’s emissaries along with emissaries from Hannibal, commander of the Roman fleet patrolling the Adriatic Sea.   Flaccus' fleet of twenty-five warships already at Brundisium, were given orders to guard the Roman Adriatic coast, and to try to determine Philip's intent and if necessary cross over to Macedonia, keeping Philip V confined there (Livy, 23.38). Livy says that 20 ships were outfitted and along with the five ships that transported the agents to Rome, were sent to join Flaccus' fleet of 25 ships. In the same passage he says that 30 ships left Ostia for Brundisium and talks about a combined fleet of 55. Walbank, p. 75, note 2, says that the 55 number given by Livy is a mistake, citing "Holleaux, 187, n. 1.").

Ruins of Beneventum

  Meanwhile Hannibal’s subordinate Hanno was able to raise troops in Samnium, but the Romans intercepted these levies in the Battle of Beneventum in 214 BCE.  Livy gives a brief description of the battle, which was part of the Roman campaign to subdue the southern Italian states that had joined Hannibal after the Battle of Cannae.  After the battle of Cannae, he had not been able to break up the Roman leagues or alliances.  Not a single member of the Roman Confederacy ever broke its treaty with Rome; the roots of Roman power in the peninsula were well established, based upon time and the mutual benefit that both Rome and her subordinate allies had received from the alliance.  To be sure, there were colonies that had been detached from the Confederacy in Cisalpine Gaul, but no seriously demoralizing blow occurred to their leagues or alliances (Dodge, Theodore (1994). Hannibal).   

Philip V of Macedon

  Rome's preoccupation with its war against Carthage provided an opportunity for Philip V of Macedon to attempt to extend his power westward. According to the ancient Greek historian Polybius, an important factor in Philip's decision to take advantage of this opportunity was the influence of Demetrius of Pharos.

  The young king whose father also named Demetrius, becoming one of Philip’s most trusted advisors, received Demetrius warmly. According to Polybius, Demetrius was instrumental in turning Philip's ambitions toward Illyria and Rome. In 217 BCE when Philip V learned of the victory of Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, over the Romans, at Lake Trasimene, Philip V at first showed the letter only to Demetrius. Perhaps seeing a chance to recover his possessions in Illyria and exact a measure of revenge on Rome, Demetrius immediately advised the young king to make peace with the Aetolians, with who Philip V was currently at war, and turn his attentions westward. In a summary of the strategy the situation called for, Polybius makes Demetrius say:

   “Italy, and your crossing into it, is the first step in the acquirement of universal empire, to which no one has a better claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the Romans have suffered a reverse” (Polybius, 5.101).

  Philip, at once began negotiations with the Aetolians. At a conference on the coast near Naupactus, Philip met the Aetolian leaders, and a peace treaty was concluded (Polybius, 5.103).  Polybius quotes the Aetolian Agelaus of Naupactus as having given the following speech in favor of peace:

“ For even now it is evident to any one who pays even a moderate attention to public affairs, that whether the Carthaginians conquer the Romans, or the Romans the Carthaginians, it is in every way probable that the victors will not remain contented with the empire of Sicily and Italy. They will move forward: and will extend their forces and their designs farther than we could wish. Wherefore, I beseech you all to be on your guard against the danger of the crisis, and above all you, O King. You will do this, if you abandon the policy of weakening the Greeks, and thus rendering them an easy prey to the invader; and consult on the contrary for their good as you would for your own person, and have a care for all parts of Greece alike, as part of your own domains. If you act in this spirit, the Greeks will be your warm friends and faithful coadjutors in all your undertakings; while foreigners will be less ready to form designs against you, seeing with dismay the firm loyalty of the Greeks. If you are eager for action, turn your eyes to the west, and let your thoughts dwell upon the wars on the Roman Peninsula.”

  Philip V had spent the winter of 217–216 BCE building a fleet of 100 warships and training men to row them, and according to Polybius, it was a practice that "hardly any Macedonian king had ever done before”(Polybius, 5.109).   Macedon probably lacked the resources to build and maintain the kind of fleet necessary to match the Romans (Walbank, p. 69; Polybius, 5.1, 5.95, 5.108)  Polybius says that Philip had no "hope of fighting the Romans at sea"(Polybius, 5.109),  perhaps referring to a lack of experience and training.  At any rate, Philip V chose to build lembis.

A Greek Lembis

  These were the small fast galleys used by the Illyrians. They had a single bank of oars and were able to carry 50 soldiers in addition to the rowers (Wilkes, p. 157; Polybius, 2.3.). With these, Philip V could only hope to avoid or evade the Roman fleet, preoccupied as he hoped it would be with Hannibal, and based, as it was, at Lilybaeum in western Sicily (Polybius, 5.10) so he thought.

  Philip V had in the meantime expanded his territories west along the Apsus and Genusus river valleys, right up to the borders of Illyricum.  Philip's plan was it seems, to first take the Illyrian coasts, conquer the area between the coasts and Macedon, and use the new land link to provide a rapid route for reinforcements across the narrow straits to the Roman Peninsula (Walbank, F. W. (1940), Philip V of Macedon).  At the beginning of summer, Philip V and his fleet left Macedon, sailed through the Euripus Strait, between the island of Euboea and Boeotia on the Greek mainland, and then rounded Cape Malea, before dropping anchor off the Islands of Cephalonia and Leucas, to await word of the location of the Roman fleet. Informed that it was still at Lilybaeum, he sailed north to Apollonia in Illyria.

  However, as the Macedonian fleet neared the island of Sazan, Philip V heard a report that some Roman quinqueremes had been spotted headed for Apollonia. Convinced that the entire Roman fleet was sailing to apprehend him, Philip ordered an immediate return to Cephalonia. Polybius speaks of "panic" and "disorder" to describe the fleet's hasty retreat, and says that in fact the Romans had sent only a squadron of ten ships, and that because of "inconsiderate alarm", Philip V had missed his best chance to achieve his aims in Illyria, returning to Macedon, "without loss indeed, but with considerable dishonor" (Polybius, 5.110).

  In the late summer of 214 BCE, Philip V again attempted an Illyrian invasion by sea, with a fleet of 120 lembi. He captured Oricum, which was lightly defended, and sailing up the Aous (modern Vjosë) river, he besieged Apollonia (Walbank, F. W. (1940), Philip V of Macedon.),

  Meanwhile the Romans having been forced to remove their fleet from Tarentum to Brundisium had to continue to watch the movements of Philip. A legion was sent in support, all under the command of the Roman propraetor Marcus Valerius Laevinus (Livy, 24.10–11, 20).   Upon receiving word from Oricum of events in Illyria, Laevinus crossed over with his fleet and army. Landing at Oricum, Laevinus was able to retake the town with little fighting.

  Meanwhile Sicily that was not directly connected with the Roman Peninsula became involved. Syracuse in Sicily was important for securing a seaport for supplies since Lilybaeum remained in Roman hands.  Hieronymus succeeded his father Heiro II the old Tyrant of Syracuse. Hieronymus was dissatisfied with his position in the Roman alliance, aided Hannibal. Therefore, Hannibal dispatched two of his lieutenants, who were of Syracusan origin to him.  They succeeded in winning Syracuse over at a price.

  In Syracuse Hieronymus (Greek: 231–214 BCE) was the tyrant of Syracuse. He succeeded his grandfather, Hiero II, in 215 BCE. He was at this time only fifteen years old, and he ascended the throne in a crisis full of peril, for the battle of Cannae had given a shock to the Roman world. The influence of which had been felt in Sicily; and though it had not shaken the fidelity of the aged Hiero, yet a large party at Syracuse was already disposed to abandon the alliance of Rome for that of Carthage. The young prince had already given indications of weakness, if not depravity of disposition, which had alarmed his grandfather, and caused him to confide the guardianship of Hieronymus to a council of fifteen persons, among who were his two sons-in-law, Andranodorus and Zoippus. But the objects of this arrangement were quickly frustrated by the ambition of Andranodorus, who, in order to get rid of the interference of his colleagues, persuaded the young king to assume the reins of government, and himself set the example of resigning his office, which was followed by the other guardians. Hieronymus now became a mere tool in the hands of his two uncles, both of whom were favorable to the Carthaginian alliance – and Thrason, the only one of his counselors who retained any influence over his mind, and who was a staunch friend of the Romans, was soon gotten rid of by a charge of conspiracy.

   The young king now sent ambassadors to Hannibal and the envoys of that general, Hippocrates and Epicydes, were welcomed at Syracuse with the highest honours. On the other hand, the deputies sent by Appius Claudius, the Roman praetor in Sicily, were met with disdain and the utmost contempt.  It was evident that Hieronymus was preparing for immediate hostilities. He sent ambassadors to Carthage, to conclude a treaty with that power, by the terms of which the river Himera was to be the boundary between the Carthaginians and Syracusans in Sicily but he quickly raised his demands, and, by a second embassy, laid claim to the whole island for himself. The Carthaginians readily promised every thing, in order to secure his alliance for the moment, and he assembled an army of fifteen thousand men, with which he was preparing to take the field, having previously dispatched Hippocrates and Epicydes to sound the disposition of the cities subject to Rome, but his plans were soon brought to an end. A band of conspirators, at the head of who was Deinomenes, fell upon him in the streets of Leontini, and dispatched him with numerous wounds, before his guards could come to his aid in 214 BCE.  The short reign of Hieronymus, which had lasted only 13 months, had presented the most striking contrast to that of his grandfather, this story is recorded by Polybius.  He believed most of the corruption stories concerning his reign was false and was just another example of Roman propaganda.

   Meanwhile back on the mainland, Marcus Claudius Marcellus ( c. 268 – 208 BCE), five times elected as consul of the Roman Republic, was an important Roman military leader during the Gallic War of 225 BCE and the Second Punic War.  Marcus Claudius Marcellus re-emerged onto both the political and military scene during the Second Punic War, in which he took part in important battles. In 216 BCE, Marcellus became a praetor in the third year of the Second Punic War elected by the senate. A praetor served either as an elected magistrate or as the commander of an army, the latter of which duties Marcellus was selected to fulfill in Sicily (Smith, William, Sir, ed. "M. Claudius M. F M. N. Marcellus", A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology).  Unfortunately, as Marcellus and his men were preparing to ship to Sicily, his army was recalled to Rome owing to the devastating losses at Cannae, one of the worst defeats in Roman history (Lendering, Jona. "Marcus Claudius Marcellus", Livius: Articles on Ancient History).   By the orders of the Senate, Marcellus was to dispatch 1,500 of his men to Rome to protect the city after the terrible defeat by Hannibal of Carthage. With his remaining army, along with remnants of the army from Cannae, (who were considered to have been disgraced by the defeat and by surviving it), Marcellus camped near Suessola, a city in the region of Campania in Southern Italy. At this point, part of the Carthaginian army began to make a move for the city of Nola. Marcellus repelled the attacks and managed to keep the city from the grasp of Hannibal. Although the battle at Nola was rather unimportant in regards to the Second Punic War as a whole, the victory was "important from its moral effect, as the first check, however slight, that Hannibal had yet received" (Smith, William, Sir, ed. "M. Claudius M. F M. N. Marcellus", A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology).

  Then, in 215 BC, the Dictator M. Junius Pera, who wanted to consult with him about the future conduct of the war, summoned Marcellus to Rome. After this meeting, Marcellus earned the title of proconsul.  In the same year, when the consul L. Postumius Albinus was killed in battle, Marcellus was unanimously chosen by the Roman people to be his successor. Livy and Plutarch tell us a bad omen occurred, allegedly because the other consul was also a plebeian. Marcellus stepped aside and Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator took his place. Supposedly, the senate (interpreting the gods) disapproved of having two plebeian consuls (Smith, William, Sir, ed. "M. Claudius M. F M. N. Marcellus", A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology).   Marcellus was appointed proconsul, whereupon, in 215 BC he defended the city of Nola, once again, from the rear guard of Hannibal’s army. In the following year, 214 BC, Fabius Maximus and Marcellus were elected as consuls. For a third time, Marcellus defended Nola from Hannibal and even captured the small but significant town of Casilinum.

Walls of the City of Nola

  Hannibal could win allies, but defending his allies against the Romans was a new and difficult problem, as the Romans could still field multiple armies greatly outnumbering his own forces.  With the situation as it was, Hannibal seemed unable to go to the aid of his allies when the Roman army threatened them and retook the territory.  Either he was short of men or supplies he was not at the right location. As an aggressive fighting general, he could conquer territory, but as a defender of his allies, it was a different story.

   In Syracuse However, Hieronymus the tyrant of Syracuse had been deposed; the new Syracusan leaders attempted reconciliation with Rome, but could not quell the Roman suspicions and then aligned themselves with the Carthaginians. In 214 BCE, Marcus Claudius Marcellus arrived in Sicily; Marcellus attacked the city of Leontini, where the two Syracusan rulers were residing. After successfully storming the city, Marcellus had 2,000 Roman deserters (who had been hiding in the city) killed, and moved to lay siege to Syracuse itself.   At this point, several cities in the province of Sicily rose in rebellion against Roman rule. The siege lasted for two long years, partly because the military machines of the famous inventor Archimedes thwarted the Roman effort.

Archimedes of Syracuse

  Archimedes of Syracuse (“Archimedes". Collins Dictionary.) was an Ancient Greek mathematician, physicist, engineer, inventor, and astronomer. Although few details of his life are known, he is regarded as one of the leading scientists in classical Greek Antiquity (287 BCE – c.212 BCE). A man who was able to invent weapons for war.

    One weapon he invented was called The Claw of Archimedes was a weapon that he is said to have designed in order to defend the city of Syracuse. Also known as "the ship shaker," the claw consisted of a crane-like arm from which a large metal grappling hook was suspended. When the claw was lowered on an attacking ship, the arm would swing upwards, lifting the ship out of the water and possibly sinking it.  Another weapon was named the heat ray. 

Archimedes’ Heat Ray

 The 2nd century CE author Lucian wrote that during the Siege of Syracuse (c. 214–212 BCE), Archimedes destroyed enemy ships with fire. Centuries later, Anthemius of Tralles mentions burning-glasses as Archimedes' weapon ( Hippias, 2 (cf. Galen, On temperaments 3.2, who mentions pyreia, "torches"); Anthemius of Tralles). The device, sometimes called the "Archimedes heat ray", focused sunlight onto approaching ships, causing them to catch fire.   Archimedes also has been given credit with improving the power and accuracy of the catapult, and with inventing the odometer during the First Punic War. The odometer is described as a cart with a gear mechanism that dropped a ball into a container after each mile traveled (“Ancient Greek Scientists: Hero of Alexandria“. Technology Museum of Thessaloniki).

  Meanwhile, leaving the bulk of the Roman legion in the command of Appius Claudius at Syracuse, Marcellus and a small army roamed Sicily, conquering opponents and taking such rebellious cities as Helorus, Megara, and Herbessus.

  After Marcellus returned and continued the siege, the Carthaginians attempted to relieve the city, but were repulsed. Overcoming formidable resistance and the ingenious devices of Archimedes, the Romans finally took the city in the summer of 212 BCE. Plutarch wrote that Marcellus, when he had previously entered the city for a diplomatic meeting with the Syracusans, had noticed a weak point in its fortifications. He made his attack at this fragile spot, using a night attack by a small group of handpicked soldiers to storm the walls and open the gates (Smith, William, Sir, ed. "M. Claudius M. F M. N. Marcellus", A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology).   During the fighting, Archimedes was killed, an act Marcellus regretted (Rorres, Chris. "Death of Archimedes: Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences).   Plutarch writes that the Romans rampaged through the city, taking as much of the plunder and artwork that they could find (Lendering, Jona. "Marcus Claudius Marcellus", Livius: Articles on Ancient History).

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Phase 6

The Southern Roman Campaign

  While the Romans were busy raising an army and sorting out political/religious matters, Hannibal had marched in a leisurely manner south from Hartia. His army, rested, restored to health, retrained and re-equipped, cut a path of destruction through central Italy as they collected grain, cattle, provisions and supplies during the march. Hannibal followed the coastal plain before turning west. Near the town of Arpi, the Roman army under Fabius Maximus made contact with the Carthaginian army and camped at Aecae, six miles away from the Carthaginian camp (Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War p68).

Remains of the town of Arpi

  Hannibal drew up his army and offered battle, but Fabius Maximus ignored the offer and the Roman army remained in their camp. Pliny also enumerates that Aecani was among the inland towns of Apulia (iii. 11); but its position is more clearly determined by the Itineraries, which place it on the Appian Way between Equus Tuticus and Herdonia, at a distance of 29 to 31 kilometers (18 to 19 mi) from the latter city (Antoine Itinerary p. 116;).   It was located in south central Italy so by this time Hannibal had passed up Rome to the east while heading south.

Fabius Maximus Cunctator (the Delayer)

   Having ravaged Apulia without provoking Fabius Maximus into battle Hannibal decided to march through Samnium and Campania.

Ancient Map of Samnium and Campania

  Apulia covers an area of about 7,336 miles.  So he was moving from the east coast of Italy to the west coast of Italy. Campania was one of the richest and most fertile regions of Italy, hoping that devastation there would draw Fabius in battle the latter was aware that there were excellent opportunities to trap the Carthaginians on the Campania plain and to force Hannibal to fight in the surrounding mountains or the ground of his own choice.  As the year wore on, Hannibal realized that it would be unwise to winter in the already devastated lowlands of Campania, but Fabius had ensured that all the passes out of Campania were blocked.  The situation led to a diversion at night in which the Carthaginians made good their escape by tricking the Romans into believing they were heading for the heights through the forest above them. The Carthaginians decoyed the Roman’s attention and slipped through the pass undetected with all their baggage train. Fabius was within striking distance but in this case, his caution worked against him. Smelling a stratagem (rightly), he stayed put. 

    For the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters in the Apulian plain. What Hannibal achieved in extricating his army was, as Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being used by later military manuals" (Goldsworthy, Adrian K. The Roman Army at War  100 BCE — AD CE).  This was a severe blow to Fabius' prestige and soon after this, his period of dictatorial power ended.  Apulia is a region of in Southern Italy bordering the Adriatic Sea in the east, the Ionian Sea to the southeast, and the Strait of Òtranto and Gulf of Taranto in the south.  Its southernmost portion, known as Salento peninsula, forms a high heel on the "boot" of Italy. 

  Apulia is one of the richest archaeological regions in Italy. It was first colonized by Mycenaean Greeks (Elizabeth A. Fisher, The Mycenaeans and Apulia). During the 8th century BCE, the Ancient Greeks expanded until reaching the area of Taranto and Salento in Greater Greece. In the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, the Greek settlement at Taras produced a distinctive style of pottery.  Apulia was an important area for the ancient Romans, who conquered it during the course of wars against the Samnites and against Pyrrhus in the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE.  Apulia was an area, which produced grain and olive oil

  Minucius, the Master of Horse under Fabius, who was one of the leading critics in the army against the adaptation of the Fabian strategy as soon as he secured a minor success, by winning a skirmish with the Carthaginians, the Senate promoted Minucius to same imperium (power of command) as Fabius when he was accused of cowardice.  Fabius became unpopular in Rome since his tactics did not lead to a quick  

 Fabius used attrition warfare against Hannibal, cutting off his supply lines and avoiding pitched battles. These tactics proved unpopular with the Romans, who, as they recovered from the shock of Hannibal's victories, began to question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy that had given the Carthaginian army a chance to regroup (Liddell Hart, Basil. Strategy).  Therefore, when Fabius’ term ended, the Senate did not renew his dictatorial powers.   The consuls Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus were appointed to command at first. But in 216 BCE, when elections resumed, Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus were elected as consuls, and placed in command of a newly raised army of unprecedented size, and directed them to engage Hannibal and end the war. Polybius wrote:  

“The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. ...Most of their wars are decided by one consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.”

— Polybius, the Histories of Polybius ("Internet Ancient History Sourcebook").

  Eight legions, some 40,000 Roman soldiers and an estimated 2,400 cavalry, formed the nucleus of this massive new army. As each legion was accompanied by an equal number of allied troops, and allied cavalry numbered around 4,000, the army that faced Hannibal was likely no less than 90,000 (Cottrell, Leonard. Enemy of Rome). However, some have suggested that the destruction of an army of 90,000 troops would be impossible. They argue that Rome probably had 48,000 troops and 6,000 cavalry against Hannibal's 35,000 troops and 10,000 cavalry (The Cambridge Ancient History VIII: Rome and the Mediterranean 218–133 BCE). Livy quotes one source stating the Romans added only 10,000 men to their usual army (Livy. The History of Rome by Titus Livius: Books 9 

- Twenty-Six, trans. D. Spillan and Cyrus Edmonds).  While no definitive record of the number of Roman troops exists, all sources agree that the Carthaginians faced a considerably larger foe.

  In the spring of 216 BCE, Hannibal took the initiative and seized a large supply depot at Cannae, in the Apulian plain, placing himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply.

   As Polybius noted, the capture of Cannae "caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding district"("Internet Ancient History Sourcebook).   The consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward in search of him. After two days' march, they found him on the left bank of the Aufidus River, and encamped six miles (10 km) away.

The Aufidus River Today

There were two Roman bridges that crossed the River, one further upstream and another closer to Hannibal’s position.  The Aufidus River (the modern Ofanto River) cuts the Apulia region in half and its source is in Campania from there it flows into the Adriatic Sea. The River is about 170 miles long.

  Reportedly, a Carthaginian officer named Gisgo commented on how much larger the Roman army was. Hannibal replied, "Another thing that has escaped your notice, Gisgo, is even more amazing—that although there are so many of them, there is not one among them called Gisgo"(Lazenby, J.F. Hannibal's War).

  After the campaigns in 217 BCE, Hannibal had failed to obtain a following by the Italian people who lived near Rome, or the Latin areas, or in southern Italy such as the Campania.  The Roman senate authorized the raising of double-sized armies by the Consuls Gaius Varro and Aemilius Paulus.  By some estimates, the Romans had raised an army possibly as large as 100,000 men, although this figure may not be accurate.

    The Consul Gaius Terentius Varro was considered by contemporary sources as a man of reckless nature and a man of extreme pride, who was determined to defeat Hannibal. While the Romans were approaching Cannae, a small portion of Hannibal's forces ambushed them. Varro successfully repelled the attack and continued on his way to Cannae. This victory, though essentially a mere skirmish with no lasting strategic value, greatly bolstered the confidence of the Roman army, perhaps to overconfidence on Varro's part. Lucius Aemilius Paulus, however, was opposed to the engagement as it was taking shape. Unlike Varro, he was prudent and cautious, and he believed it was foolish to fight on open ground, despite the Romans' numerical strength. This was especially true since Hannibal held the advantage in cavalry (in both quality and quantity).  Despite these misgivings, Lucius Aemilius Paullus thought it unwise to withdraw the army after the initial success, and camped two-thirds of the army east of the Aufidus River, sending the remainder to fortify a position on the opposite side. The purpose of this second camp, was to cover the foraging parties from the main camp and harass those of the enemy (Cottrell, Leonard. Enemy of Rome).

Roman Bridge near Cannae

  The two armies stayed in their respective locations for two days. During the second day (August 1), Hannibal, aware that Varro would be in command the following day, left his camp and offered battle, but Paullus refused. When his ploy did not work, Hannibal, recognizing the importance of the water from the Aufidus to the Roman troops sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass water-bearing soldiers outside of the camp fortifications. According to Polybius ("Internet Ancient History Sourcebook").   Hannibal's cavalry boldly rode up to the edge of the Roman encampment, causing havoc and thoroughly disrupting the supply of water to the Roman camp (Caven, B. Punic Wars).

    The Carthaginian army was a combination of warriors from numerous regions. Along with the core of 8,000 Libyans, there were 8,000 Iberians, 16,000 Gauls (8,000 were left at camp the day of battle) and around 5,500 Gaetulian infantry. Hannibal's cavalry also came from diverse backgrounds. He commanded 4,000 Numidian, 2,000 Iberian, 4,000 Gallic and 450 Liby-Phoenician cavalry. Finally, Hannibal had around 8,000 skirmishers consisting of Balearic slingers and mixed nationality spearmen, totaling around 47,950 men. The uniting factor for the Carthaginian army was the personal tie each group had with Hannibal (Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War).

  Rome's forces used typical Roman equipment including pila (heavy javelins) and hastae (thrusting spears) as weapons as well as traditional helmets, shields and body armor.

Roman Heavy Infantry in the Roman Republic

  On the other hand, the Carthaginian army used a variety of equipment. The Iberians fought with swords suited for cutting and thrusting, as well as javelins and various types of spears. For defense, Iberian warriors carried large oval shields and the falcata.

The Iberian Falcata

The Gauls were likely wearing no armor, and the typical Gaulish weapon was usually a long, slashing sword (Polybius, Penguin Classics translation).  The heavy Carthaginian cavalry carried two javelins and a curved slashing sword, with a heavy shield for protection. The Numidian cavalry were very lightly equipped, lacking saddles and bridles for their horses, and used no armor but carried small shields, javelins and possibly a knife or longer blade. Skirmishers acting as light infantry carried either slings or spears. The Balearic slingers, who were famous for their accuracy, carried short, medium and long slings used to cast stones or bullets. They may have carried a small shield or simple leather pelt on their arms, but this is uncertain. Hannibal wore Musculata armor and carried a falcata as well (Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, pp. 107–108).

Muscle Cuirass (or Musculata) worn by Hannibal

   It has been much debated how the Libyan line infantry was armed. Head has argued in favor of short stabbing spears (Duncan Head, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars). Polybius states that the Libyans fought with equipment taken from previously defeated Romans. It is unclear whether he meant only shields and armor or offensive weapons as well (Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, p. 89.)  A general reading suggests Polybius meant the whole panoply of arms and armor and even tactical organization. Apart from his description of the battle itself. Polybius later discussing the subject of the Roman legion versus the Greek phalanx, says that: "...against Hannibal, the defeats they suffered had nothing to do with weapons or formations" because, "Hannibal himself...discarded the equipment with which he had started out (and) armed his troops with Roman weapons" (Polybius, Penguin Classics translation, p.509).   Dally is inclined to the view that Libyan infantry would have copied the Iberian use of the sword during their fighting there so was armed similarly to the Romans (Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, p. 90).

     The conventional deployment for armies of the time was placement of infantry in the center, with the cavalry in two flanking "wings". The Romans followed this convention closely, but chose extra depth rather than breadth for the infantry, hoping to use this to break through the center of Hannibal’s line. Varro knew how the Roman infantry had managed to penetrate Hannibal's center at Trebia, and he planned to recreate this on an even greater scale. 

  The Principes located immediately behind the Hastati, ready to push forward at first contact to ensure the Romans presented a unified front. 

As Polybius wrote, "the maniples were nearer each other, or the intervals were decreased...and the maniples showed more depth than front"(Dodge, Theodore. Hannibal).   Even though they outnumbered the Carthaginians, this depth-oriented deployment meant that the Roman lines had a front of roughly equal size to their numerically inferior opponents.

  The Roman army was organized into three lines: the Hastati, the Principes, and the Triarii.

The Triari were the most experienced of the Roman soldiers

  These soldiers were placed according to their experience, with the youngest soldiers the Hastati making the first engagement. Where resistance was strong, this rank would dissolve back through the Roman line and allow the more experienced soldiers in the Principes to fight. In turn, the Principes could yield to the hardened Triarii if necessary. The latter situation led to the Roman saying "ad triarios redisse", "to fall back on the Triarii", meaning that things had come to a desperate pass.  The maniples in each line generally formed with a one-maniple space between each (soldier) maniple and its neighbours, and the maniples in each of the forward lines covering the gaps in the line behind, so that retreating troops of the forward lines could withdraw without disrupting those behind them. Sources disagree on the numbers involved and in all likelihood they varied considerably but a generally accepted number is 20 maniples of Hastati and 20 of Principes of approximately 120 men each and 20 half strength maniples of "Triarii", for a total of 6,000 men.  The maniple typically consisted of 120 soldiers arrayed in three ranks of 40 men when engaged in battle (Primary sources for early Roman military organization includes the writings of Polybius and Livy). It was a formation to where the Romans could always rotate fresh men to the front to do battle and it was very effective as one of line of men could fall behind a fresh line of soldiers and visa versa.

The Roman Maniple Formation

  To Varro, it seemed that Hannibal had little room to maneuver and no means of retreat as his back was to the Aufidus River. Varro believed that when pressed hard by the Romans' superior numbers, the Carthaginians would fall back to the river and, with no room to maneuver, be destroyed in the panic. Bearing in mind that Hannibal's two previous victories were won by his trickery and ruse, Varro had sought an open battlefield. The field at Cannae was clear, where no hidden troops could be brought to bear in an ambush (Moreman, Douglas. "Cannae – A Deception that Keeps on Deceiving").

  Hannibal, on the other hand, had deployed his forces based on the particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into consideration both their strengths and weaknesses (Cottrell, Leonard. Enemy of Rome).  He placed his Iberians and Gauls in the middle, alternating the ethnic composition across the front line, with himself at the front and center. Infantry from Punic Africa was on the wings at the very edge of his infantry line. These infantry were battle-hardened, remained cohesive and would attack the Roman flanks.  Hasdrubal led the Iberian and Gaulish cavalry on the left (south near the Aufidus River) of the Carthaginian army. By placing the flank of his army on the Aufidus River, Hannibal prevented this flank from being overlapped by the more numerous Romans. Hasdrubal had about 6,500 cavalry, and Hanno had 3,500 Numidians on the right.  

   Hannibal  intended that his cavalry, comprising mainly medium Hispanic cavalry andNumidian light horse, and positioned on the flanks, would defeat the weaker Roman cavalry and swing around to attack the Roman infantry from the rear as it pressed upon Hannibal's weakened center. His veteran African troops would then press in from the flanks at the crucial moment, and encircle the overextended Romans.

  The Romans were in front of the hill leading to Cannae and hemmed in on their right flank by the Aufidus River, so that their left flank was the only viable means of retreat (Bradford, E. Hannibal). In addition, the Carthaginian forces had maneuvered so that the Romans would face east. Not only would the morning sun shine low into the Romans' eyes, but also the southeasterly winds would blow sand and dust into their faces as they approached the battlefield (Dodge, Theodore. Hannibal). Hannibal's unique deployment of his army, based on his perception of the terrain and understanding of the capabilities of his troops, proved decisive.

   As the armies advanced on one another, Hannibal gradually extended the center of his line.  Polybius describes: "After thus drawing up his whole army in a straight line, he took the central companies of Hispanics and Celts and advanced with them, keeping the rest of them in contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to employ the Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Hispanics and Celts." Polybius described the weak Carthaginian center as deployed in a crescent, curving out toward the Romans in the middle with the African troops on their flanks in echelon formation (“Internet Ancient History Sourcebook”).

The Echelon Formation

  An echelon formation is a military formation in which its units are arranged diagonally. Each unit is stationed behind and to the right (a "right echelon"), or behind and to the left ("left echelon"), of the unit ahead.  Hannibal capitalized on Varro’s egotism and drew him into a trap using an enveloping tactic that eliminated the Roman numerical superiority by shrinking the area where combat would occur.  Hannibal drew up his least reliable infantry in the center of the semicircle with the wings covered by the Gallic and Numidian horse.

  It is thought that the purpose of this formation was to break the forward momentum of the Roman infantry, and delay its advance before other developments allowed Hannibal to deploy his African infantry most effectively (Healy, Mark. Cannae: Hannibal Smashes Rome's Army).  While the majority of historians feel that Hannibal's action was deliberate, some have called this account fanciful. They claim that the actions of the day represent either the natural curvature that occurs when a broad front of infantry marches forward, or the bending back of the Carthaginian center from the shock action of meeting the heavily massed Roman center (Healy, Mark. Cannae: Hannibal Smashes Rome's Army).

The Battle of Cannae

  The Roman legions forced their way through Hannibal’s weak center, but the Libyan mercenaries on the wings swung around their advance menacing their flanks.  The onslaught of Hannibal’s cavalry was irresistible. The cavalry engaged in a fierce exchange on the flanks. Polybius described the Hispanic and Celtic horse dismounting in what he considers a barbarian method of fighting. When the Hispanic and Gauls got the upper hand, they cut down the Roman cavalry without giving quarter ("Internet Ancient History Sourcebook").

On the other flank, the Numidians engaged in a way that merely kept the Roman allied cavalry occupied. When the victorious Hispanic and Gallic cavalry came up, the allied cavalry broke and the Numidians pursued them off the field ("Internet Ancient History Sourcebook”).

  While the Carthaginians were in the process of defeating the cavalry, the mass of infantry on both sides advanced towards each other in the center of the field. The wind from the east blew dust in the Romans' faces and obscured their vision. While the wind was not a major factor, the dust that both armies created would have been potentially debilitating to sight (Dodge, Theodore. Hannibal).  Although it made seeing difficult, troops would still have been able to see others in the vicinity. The dust, however, was not the only psychological factor involved in battle. Because of the somewhat distant battle location, both sides had to fight with little sleep. The Romans faced another disadvantage caused by lack of proper hydration due to Hannibal's attack on the Roman encampment during the previous day. Furthermore, the massive number of troops would have led to an overwhelming amount of background noise. All of these psychological factors made battle especially difficult for the infantrymen (Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War).

  Hannibal stood with his men in the weak center and held them to a controlled retreat. The crescent of Hispanic and Gallic troops buckled inwards as they gradually withdrew. Knowing the superiority of the Roman infantry, Hannibal had instructed his infantry to withdraw deliberately, creating an even tighter semicircle around the attacking Roman forces. By doing so, he had turned the strength of the Roman infantry into a weakness. 

While the front ranks were gradually advancing, the bulk of the Roman troops began to lose their cohesion, as they began crowding themselves into the growing gap. Soon they were compacted together so closely that they had little space to wield their weapons. In pressing so far forward in their desire to destroy the retreating and seemingly collapsing line of Hispanic and Gallic troops, the Romans had ignored (possibly due to the dust) the African troops that stood uncommitted on the projecting ends of this now-reversed crescent (Healy, Mark. Cannae: Hannibal Smashes Rome's Army).   This also gave the Carthaginian cavalry time to drive the Roman cavalry off on both flanks and attack the Roman center in the rear. The Roman infantry, now stripped of protection on both its flanks, formed a wedge that drove deeper and deeper into the Carthaginian semicircle, driving itself into an alley formed by the African infantry on the wings (Cottrell, Leonard. Enemy of Rome).   At this decisive point, Hannibal ordered his African infantry to turn inwards and advance against the Roman flanks, creating encirclement in one of the earliest known examples of a pincer movement.  The pincer movement typically occurs when opposing forces advance towards the center of an army that responds by moving its outside forces to the enemy's flanks to surround it.

Hannibal’s Pincer Movement

  When the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Romans in the rear and the African flanking echelons assailed them on their right and left, the advance of the Roman infantry came to an abrupt halt. The Romans were now trapped in a pocket with no means of escape. The Carthaginians created a wall and began destroying them. Polybius wrote, "as their outer ranks were continually cut down, and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood” (Healy, Mark. Cannae: Hannibal Smashes Rome's Army).  

The Death of Consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus at Cannae

 As Livy described, "So many thousands of Romans were dying... Some, whom their wounds, pinched by the morning cold, had roused, as they were rising up, covered with blood, from the midst of the heaps of slain, were overpowered by the enemy. Some were found with their heads plunged into the earth, which they had excavated; having thus, as it appeared, made pits for themselves, and having suffocated themselves” (Livy. The History of Rome by Titus Livius: Books Nine to Twenty-Six, trans. D. Spillan and Cyrus Edmonds). Cowley claims that nearly six hundred legionaries were slaughtered each minute until darkness ended the bloodletting (Cowley, Robert (ed.), Parker, Geoffrey (ed.) The Reader's Companion to Military History, "Battle of Cannae"). Only 14,000 Roman troops managed to escape, most of whom had cut their way through to the nearby town of Canusium. Canusium (modern Canosa di Puglia) was a town in Apulia in southern Italy, between Bari and Foggia, not far from the position on the Aufidus River (Ofanto River) where the Roman soldiers found refuge after their defeat at the Battle of Cannae.

  Polybius writes that of the Roman and allied infantry, 70,000 were killed, 10,000 captured, and "perhaps" 3,000 survived. He also reports that of the 6,000 Roman and allied cavalry, only 370 survived (Polybius. The Histories, 3.117).  Livy wrote, "Forty thousand foot, two thousand seven hundred horse, there being an equal number of citizens and allies are said to have been slain." He also reports that 3,000 Roman and allied infantry and 1,500 Roman and allied cavalry were taken prisoner by the Carthaginians. Although Livy does not cite his source by name, it is likely to have been Quintus Fabius Pictor, a Roman historian who fought in and wrote on the Second Punic War. It is Pictor Livy names when reporting the casualties at the Battle of Trebia (Livy. The History of Rome by Titus Livius: Books Nine to Twenty-Six, trans. D. Spillan and Cyrus Edmonds). 

  In addition to the Consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, Livy goes on to record that among the dead were two quaestors, 29 of the 48 military tribunes (some of consular rank, including the consul of the previous year. Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, and the former Master of the Horse, Marcus Minucius Rufus), and 80 "senators or men who had held offices which would have given them the right to be elected to the Senate"(Livy. The History of Rome by Titus Livius: Books Nine to Twenty-Six, trans. D. Spillan and Cyrus Edmonds).  Some more recent historians have come up with far lower estimates. Cantalupi proposed Roman losses of 10,500 to 16,000 (Cantalupi, P. "Le Legioni Romane Nella Guerra d'Annibale"), Samuels also regards Livy's figure as far too high, on the grounds that the cavalry would have been inadequate to prevent the Roman infantry escaping to the rear. He doubts that Hannibal even wanted a high death toll, as much of the army consisted of people  whom Hannibal hoped to win as allies (Samuels, M. "The Reality of Cannae”).  Later Roman and Greco-Roman historians largely follow Livy's figures. Appian gave 50,000 killed and "a great many" taken prisoner (Appian. Hannibalic War, 4.25).   Plutarch agreed, "50,000 Romans fell in that battle... 4,000 were taken alive"(Plutarch. Fabius Maximus, 16.8). Quintilian: "60,000 men were slain by Hannibal at Cannae"(Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, 8.6.26.).  Eutropius: "20 officers of consular and praetorian rank, 30 senators, and 300 others of noble descent, were taken or slain, as well as 40,000 foot-soldiers, and 3,500 horse"(Eutropius. Abridgement of Roman History, 3.10).

  Livy recorded Hannibal's losses at "about 8,000 of his bravest men." (Livy. The History of Rome by Titus Livius: Books 9 to Twenty-Six, trans. D. Spillan and Cyrus Edmonds) Polybius reports 5,700 dead: 4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Spanish and Africans, and 200 cavalry (Polybius. The Histories, 3.117).

  “Never when the city was in safety was there so great a panic and confusion within the walls of Rome. I shall therefore shrink from the task, and not attempt to relate what in describing I must make less than the reality. The consul and his army having been lost at Lake Trasimenus the year before. It was not one wound upon another which was announced, but a multiplied disaster, the loss of two consular armies, together with the two consuls: and that now there was neither any Roman camp, nor general nor soldiery: that Apulia and Samnium, and now almost the whole of Italy, were in the possession of Hannibal. No other nation surely would not have been overwhelmed by such an accumulation of misfortune.”  —Livy, on the Roman Senate's reaction to the defeat at Cannae (Livy. The History of Rome by Titus Livius: Books Nine to Twenty-Six, trans. D. Spillan and Cyrus Edmonds).

    For a brief period, the Romans were in complete disarray. Their best armies in the peninsula were destroyed, the few remnants severely demoralized, and the only remaining Consul (Varro) completely discredited. As the story goes, Rome declared a national day of mourning as there was not a single person who had died that someone was related to or knew. The Romans became so desperate that they resorted to human sacrifice, twice burying people alive at the Forum of Rome and abandoning an oversized baby in the Adriatic Sea (Palmer, Robert EA (1997). Rome and Carthage at peace).

The two legions that survived Cannae were assigned to Sicily for the remainder of the war as punishment for their humiliating desertion of the battlefield.  In addition to the physical loss of her army, Rome suffered a symbolic defeat of prestige. A gold ring was a token of membership in the upper classes of Roman society; Hannibal and his men collected more than 200 from the corpses on the battlefield, and sent this collection to Carthage as proof of his victory. The collection was poured on the floor in front of the Punic Senate, and was judged to be "three and a half measures” (Gowen, Hilary. "Hannibal Barca and the Punic Wars).

   Hannibal had defeated the equivalent of eight consular armies (16 legions plus an equal number of allies) (Slip Knox, E.L. "The Punic Wars—Battle of Cannae"). Within just three campaign seasons (20 months), Rome had lost one-fifth (150,000) of the entire population of male citizens over 17 years of age (Cottrell, Leonard. Enemy of Rome). Furthermore, the morale effect of this victory was such that most of southern Italy joined Hannibal's cause. 

Phase 5

The Central Roman Campaign

  In early spring 217 BC, Hannibal decided to advance south, leaving his wavering Gallic allies in the Po Valley and crossing the Apennines unopposed. Afterwards, he avoided the Roman positions and took the only unguarded route into Etruria at the mouth of the Arno.

Location of the Arno River

  This route was through a huge marsh, which happened to be more flooded than usual for spring. Hannibal's army marched for several days without finding convenient places to rest, suffering terribly from fatigue and lack of sleep.

Marsh in the Arno River

This area was practically one huge marsh, and happened to be overflowing more than usual during this particular season. Hannibal knew that this route was full of difficulties, but it remained the surest and certainly the quickest way to central Italy. Polybius claims Hannibal's men marched for four days and three nights, "through a land that was under water", suffering terribly from fatigue and enforced want of sleep. He crossed the Apennines (during which he lost his right eye (John Selby Watson; Marcus Junianus; Justinus, Cornelius; Nepos, Eutropius (1853) because of conjunctivitis) and crossed the seemingly impassable Arno without opposition, but in the marshy lowlands of the Arno, he lost a large part of his force (Polybius, Histories, Book III, p74)  in the marsh of that river.

   Arriving in Etruria in the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to lure the main Roman army under Flaminius, into a pitched battle, by devastating the region Flaminius had been sent to protect. Polybius wrote that Hannibal calculated that he could draw out Flaminius into battle and that "no sooner had he left the neighborhood of Faesulae, and, advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp, made a raid upon the neighboring country, then Flaminius became excited, and enraged at the idea that he was being taunted by the enemy: and as the devastation of the country went on, and he saw from the smoke that rose in every direction that the work of destruction was proceeding, he could not patiently endure the sight”(Polybius, The Histories, 3.82).  Flaminius remained passively encamped at about 10 miles north of Lake Trasimene at Arretium.

Lake Trasimene Battlefield

 Unable to goad Flaminius into battle, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome, providing the earliest record of a deliberate turning movement in military history.  Military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge describes the significance of this maneuver and its intended effects on the campaign:

“We are told nothing about it by the ancient authors, whose knowledge of war confined them solely to the description of battles. However, it is apparent enough to us […] by this handsome march Hannibal cut Flaminius off from Rome …, as he was apt to move by the flank past the Roman camp [so as] to taunt the Roman general. Here is shown …the clear conception of the enemy’s strategic flank, neither with all its advantages […] nor by his maneuver had Hannibal recklessly cut himself loose from his base, though he was living on the country and independent of it, as it were; the fact is, that the complete integrity of his line of communication … was preserved. A perfect case of cutting the enemy from his communications can more scarcely be conceived. . . . If he [Flaminius] fought, it must be under morally and materially worse conditions than if his line was open; and the effect on his men of having the enemy between them and Rome . . . could not but be disastrous.”

  Still, Flaminius stubbornly kept his army in camp. Hannibal decided to march on towards Apulia, hoping that Flaminius might follow him to a battlefield of his own choosing (Polybius, The Histories, 3.81–3, Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.4)

  Flaminius, eager to exact revenge for the devastation of the countryside, and facing increasing political criticism from Rome, finally marched against Hannibal. Gaius Flaminius, like Tiberius Sempronius Longus, was impetuous, overconfident, and lacking in self-control (Polybius, The Histories, 3.80).  His advisors suggested that he send only a cavalry detachment to harass the Carthaginians and prevent them from laying waste to any more of the country, while reserving his main force until the other consul, Servilius, arrived with his army. However, it proved impossible to argue with the rash Flaminius. Livy wrote, "Though every other person in the council advised safe rather than showy measures, urging that he should wait for his colleague, in order that joining their armies, they might carry on the war with united courage and counsels... Flaminius, in a fury... gave out the signal for marching to battle” (Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.3).

  As Hannibal passed Lake Trasimene, he came to a place very suitable for an ambush and hearing that Flaminius had broken camp and was pursuing him, made preparations for the impending battle. To the north was a series of heavily forested hills where the Malpasso Road passed along the north side of Lake Trasimene. Along the hill-bordered skirts of the lake, Hannibal camped where he was in full view of anyone entering the northern defile, and spent the night arranging his troops for battle. Below the camp, he placed his heavy infantry (Iberians, Celts and Africans) upon a slight elevation. Here, they had ample ground from which they could charge down upon the head of the Roman column on the left flank, when it should reach this position (Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.4, Polybius, The Histories, 3.83.). His cavalry and Gallic infantry were concealed in the hills in the depth of the wooded valley from which the Romans would first enter, so that they could quickly sally out and close the entrance, blocking the Roman route of retreat. Then he posted his light troops at intervals along the heights overlooking the plain, with orders to keep well hidden in the woods until signaled to attack. In addition, the night before the battle commenced, Hannibal ordered his men to light campfires on the hills of Tuoro, at a considerable distance, to convince the Romans that his forces were further away than they actually were (Battle of Lake Trasimene, M.R. van der Werf, Ground Warfare: H-Q, 486).  Advancing through Etruria, Hannibal had provoked Gaius Flaminius into a hasty pursuit without proper reconnaissance.  Then in a defile on the shore of Lake Trasimene Hannibal lay in ambush with his whole army.  The ambush was a complete success.

  On the morning of June 21, the Roman troops marched eastward along the road running near the northern edge of the lake. Eager for battle, Flaminius pushed his men hard and hurried up the column in the rear. Hannibal then sent a small skirmish force to draw the vanguard away from the front of the line, in order to split the Roman forces. Once all the Romans had at last marched through the foggy, narrow defile and entered the plains skirting the lake, trumpets sounded, signaling the general attack.

  The Carthaginian cavalry and infantry swept down from their concealed positions in the surrounding hills, blocked the road and engaged the unsuspecting Romans from three sides. Surprised and outmaneuvered, the Romans did not have time to draw up in battle array, and had to fight a desperate hand-to-hand battle in open order. The Romans were divided quickly into three parts. The Roman cavalry was pushed into the lake, leaving the other two groups with no way to retreat. In the centre, including Flaminius, the Romans stood their ground. However, they were cut down by Hannibal’s Gauls after three hours of heavy combat.  

The Battle of Lake Trasimene

In less than four hours, the Roman army was annihilated. The vanguard saw little combat and, once the disaster to their rear became obvious, some fought their way through the skirmishers and out of the forest. Of the initial Roman force of about 30,000, about 15,000 were either killed in battle or drowned while trying to escape into the lake — including Flaminius himself, who was killed by the Gaul Ducarius. Another 10,000 are reported to have made their way back to Rome by various means, and the rest were captured (Polybius, The Histories, 3.84, Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.6-7 (who for the casualty figure cites Quintus Fabius Pictor, a historian who fought in and wrote on the Second Punic War). Hannibal's losses were 2,500, plus "many" who died of their wounds (Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.7)  About 6,000 Romans escaped, under the cover of fog, only to be captured by Maharbal,  Hannibal’s Calvary Commander, the following day. Both Livy and Polybius wrote that Maharbal promised safe passage ("with a garment apiece") if they surrendered their weapons and amour, but Hannibal had them sold into slavery irrespective of the promise made (Polybius, The Histories, 3.84-5, this was a common custom on both sides).  The disaster for Rome did not end there. Furthermore Cornelius Scipio, aware of this battle sent his cavalry within a day or two, as a reinforcement force of 4,000 under the propraetor (or a proconsul who acted in place of a Consul) Gaius Centenius which was intercepted and destroyed (Livy, Ab Urbe condita, 22.8; Polybius).

   Hannibal, emerging from another brilliant victory, had successfully planned and executed the greatest ambush in history (Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy).   Dodge writes, “It is the only instance in history of lying in ambush with the whole of a large army.” Similarly, historian Robert L. O'Connell also writes, “[It was] the only time an entire large army was effectively swallowed and destroyed by such a maneuver.”

Hannibal

  Because of this victory, they had more military booty than they could handle, so the surplus was sold to Egyptian traders, to be sold it back to the Romans.  Like all previous engagements prisoners had propaganda value, they were sorted out between Romans and non-Romans.  The Romans remained captured, while the non-Romans were released to spread the news that the Carthaginian armies were in Italy to fight for their freedom from the Romans.  However, Hannibal did not attack Rome, instead he marched south with the hopes of gaining allies from the Greek and Italian population in that part of Italy.  Nevertheless, things did not go similar to the successes he had among the Gallic tribes of northern Italy.  No doubt while Hannibal was in the region of Latium where they city Rome lay he sent probes into the area to see how well it was defended but he would take not further actions on this objective.  Rome was surrounded by a wall called the Servian Wall at this time.

The City of Rome with the Servian Wall in Green

  There was panic and disorder in Rome when rumors about Trasimene spread among the city population, which were confirmed when the praetor Marcus Pomponius curtly announced in the Forum "We have been defeated in a great battle” (Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage p190).  The defeat of Lake Trasimene put the Romans in an immense state of panic, fearing for the existence of the city. The Senate met in continual session to debate the next course of action until three days later the news of the defeat of the Roman cavalry by Maharbal arrived in Rome. The Roman senate and the people, realizing the gravity of the situation, decided to elect a dictator (for the first time since 249 BCE) to direct the war effort. As one of the elected consuls was dead and the other one away with his army, a dictator was elected by the senate instead of one chosen by one of the consuls.  Quintus Fabius Maximus, a member of the patrician Fabii, who had suggested that an election should take place, was elected into office by the assembled centuries of the people, his term in office being set for the next six months. Fabius, 58 years of age, nearly 30 years older than Hannibal, at that time carried the nickname "Verrucosus" or "Spotty" because of a wart on his face. His past political record was anything but spotty; he had fought in the First Punic War, had been elected consul in 233 and 228 BCE. He was one of the elected censors in 230 BCE, and was granted a triumph for his efforts against the Ligurians. Normally a dictator chose his own deputy, the Master of Horse, but Fabius received as his Master of Horse Marcus Minucius Rufus (a plebeian who was consul in 221 BCE), in an unusual political gesture (Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage, p191).   It was suggested that the post of Fabius was that of a pro-dictator (acting dictator), but it seems Fabius enjoyed all the powers of a dictator during his term.       

  The city of Rome's history spans more than two and a half thousand years, since its legendary founding in 753 BCE. Rome is one of the oldest continuously occupied cities in Europe.  In the ancient world, it was successively the capital city of the Roman Kingdom, the Roman Republic and later the Roman Empire.

Part of the Servian Wall today

The third and second century BCE saw the establishment of the Roman hegemony over the Mediterranean and the East, through the two Punic Wars fought against the city of Carthage ((1964. Dtv-atlas zur Weltgeschichte). Then were established the first Roman provinces: Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica up to this point in time.

  From the beginning of the 2nd century BC, the power shared between two groups of aristocrats: those who claimed to be traditionalists, representing the   conservative part of the Senate, and the populares, were leaders in the late Roman Republic who relied on the people’s assemblies and tribunate to acquire political power. They are considered by modern scholarship as in opposition to the optimates, which relied on the help of the urban populace to gain the power. In the same period, the bankruptcy of the small farmers and the establishment of large slave estates provoked the migration to the city of a large number of people. The continuous warfare made necessary a professional army, which was more loyal to its chiefs than to the republic. 

  Due to that, in the second half of the second century and during the first century BCE saw fights abroad and at home.  A defensive wall that even was located on part on the Tiber River surrounded the city.  There is a chance that there was an armed camp in Rome at this time, but it is unknown how many legions were defending it.

  For some reason Hannibal avoided taking the city of Rome.  He passed right by it to the east closer to the east coast and the Adriatic than the province of Latium where Rome was located.  Latium (Latin: Latium) is the region of central western Italy in which the city of Rome was founded and grew to be the capital city of the Roman Republic. Latium was originally a small triangle of fertile, volcanic soil on which resided the tribe of the Latins (Mogens Herman Hansen (2000). “A Comparative Study of Thirty City-state Cultures: An Investigation“). It was located on the left bank (east and south) of the Tiber river, extending northward to the Anio river (a left-bank tributary of the Tiber) and southeastward to the Pomptina Palus (Pontine Marshes, now the Pontine Fields) as far south as the Circeian promontory (Cary, M.; Scullard, H. H. (1975). A History of Rome: Down to the Reign of Constantine).

    The Romans needed to prepare a proper reception should Hannibal decide to show up outside Rome with his army. Fabius first set about restoring the morale of the Roman people and then tackled the task of preparing the defenses of Rome after receiving his post. He took meticulous care in observing all the religious procedures attached to state affairs and all the civil procedures related to state administration to boost the morale of the city population, after having blamed the Trasimene disaster on the lack of proper religious observations by the dead Consul Flaminius. The senate consulted the Sibylline Books at the suggestion of Fabius and a praetor was assigned to appease the Roman gods through generous sacrifices. Divine duties taken care of, Fabius next went on and preparing for Hannibal's anticipated visit to Latium, being ignorant of his location and intention at that time.  The city walls were repaired; Minucius was put in charge of preparing a “reception committee” by raising two Roman and two allied legions and attached cavalry units to defend the city in nearby Tibur. The un-walled towns in Latium were evacuated, and their inhabitants were moved into walled towns. Certain bridges were destroyed to deny the Carthaginians easy passage through Latium.  Hannibal through his probes must have been aware of some of what the Romans were preparing for him should he attack the city.  His forces were not large enough nor had the capacity to 

throw a pitched battle in order to take Rome.  Therefore, an attack against a well-prepared defense such as Rome’s would have meant a costly battle one in which the price might be too high.  It would be better to live to fight another day when the conditions were in his favor. He was aware of the availability of his supplies and reinforcements from Iberia thanks to the army of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus.  A Carthaginian fleet appeared in the Adriatic possibly with the intention to re-supply him.  Nevertheless, when they encountered a large Roman naval force they retreated without a fight.

  It is a matter of speculation why Hannibal did not march on Rome or what might have happened had he done so immediately after Trasimene (Strategy, B.H. Liddell Hart, p. 26).I believe he wanted to make allies of all who lived in central region of the Roman Republic.  He felt that if he could create such a consensus the Roman Republic could be defeated easily.  The problem was that the central part of the Peninsula by this time was so tight with the Romans it was not possible.  All of these people felt that now they were part if the Great Roman Republic.  They had made their alliances and they kept them.  This was a miscalculation by Hannibal if that was his strategy. He was not going to gain them as allies.

    The Carthaginian army instead marched south-east into Umbria, through Perugia, although Livy refers to a failed siege of Spoletiuma Latin colony (Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War, p66)  Polybius does not mention it, and it is likely that only some Carthaginian raiders troubled the Latin colony (Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War, p66). If it is possible that these raiders were, probes sent out by Hannibal to do a reconnaissance of Rome’s defenses.  Hannibal, all the while ravaging the countryside, marched through Picenum towards the Adriatic coast, reaching Herita 10 days after leaving Lake Trasimene. Here Hannibal rested his army, which was suffering from scurvy, refitted the Libyan/African troops with captured Roman equipment and retrained them, and by using low grade local wine (acetum) as an ointment, brought the cavalry horses back to health (Cottrell, Leonard, Hannibal Enemy of Rome, p118).  With no Roman army situated near him, Hannibal was free to choose his next course of action unhindered.  

  Once it was clear that Hannibal was not marching towards Rome, Fabius ordered the army of Servilius into Latium. When Fabius left Rome he and took over command of the army near Narnia, (Polybius 3.88.3) or a few miles south at Ocriculum (Livy 22.11.5).  Then he joined the army of Minucius at Tibur and marched along the Via Appia into Apulia in southeastern Italy.

The Via Appia

   Departing from Roman military traditions, Fabius adopted the strategy named after him: avoiding open battle, while placing several Roman armies in Hannibal's vicinity in order to watch and limit his movements.  He would avoid open battle while constantly harassing his enemy’s outriders.   Having ravaged Apulia without bringing Fabius to battle, Hannibal decided to march through Samnium to Campania, one of the richest and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would draw Fabius into battle.

The Region of Apulia

Fabius closely followed Hannibal's path of destruction, yet still refused to let himself be drawn out of the defensive. This strategy was unpopular with many Romans, who believed it was a form of cowardice.  This course of action was not popular among his soldiers and they gave him the nickname "The Delayer" since he seemed to be avoiding battle while the enemy was devastating Italy.  It was widely feared that as long as Hannibal’s army ravaged and plundered the Roman countryside unopposed their terrified allies might soon plead their allegiance to Carthage rather than to Rome.