Phase 3

The Northern Roman Campaign

  After avoiding a pitched battle at the Rhone River Crossing, Hannibal came to the aid of his Gallic allies who were being hemmed in by Roman reinforcements.  He crossed the Alps, surmounting difficulties of climate and terrain, and the guerilla attacks of the native tribes. 

Hannibal Crossing the Alps 

  Hannibal’s exact route over the Alps has been the source of scholarly dispute for a long time. (Polybius, the surviving ancient account closest in time to Hannibal's campaign, reports that the route was in doubt.) The most influential modern theories favor either a march up the valley of the Rhône and a crossing of the main range to the south of the modern highway over the Col de Montgenèvre. Or a march farther north up the valleys of the Isère and Arc crossing the main range near the present Col de Mont Cenis or the Little St Bernard Pass (Montgenèvre: Peter Connolly, Hannibal and the Enemies of Rome). Recent numismatic evidence suggests that Hannibal's army may have passed within sight of the Matterhorn (McMenamin, M. (2012). "Depiction of the Alps on Punic coins from Campania, Italy").

  By Livy's account, the crossing in the face of huge difficulties was accomplished (Livy History of Rome book 21, 36).  These Hannibal surmounted with ingenuity.  According to Polybius, he arrived in Italy accompanied by 20,000-foot soldiers and 4,000 cavalry, and only a few elephants (No one agrees on these figures there is some doubt about the elephants too).   If Polybius is correct in his figure for the number of troops, he commanded after the crossing of the Rhône, this would suggest that he had lost almost half of his force. Historians like Serge Lancel have questioned the reliability of the figures for the number of troops he had when he left Iberia (S. Lancel, Hannibal (1995; English translation 1999).  From the start, he seems to have calculated that he would have to operate without immediate aid from Iberia (Spain) he was aware of the Romans going to Iberia when he did not give them battle near the Rhone (as already noted).

  Hannibal's vision of military affairs, derived partly from the teaching of his Greek tutors and experience gained alongside his father, stretched over most of the Hellenistic World of his time. Indeed, the breadth of his vision gave rise to his grand strategy of conquering Rome by opening a northern front and subduing allied city-states on the peninsula rather than by attacking Rome directly. Historical events, which led to the defeat of Carthage during the First Punic War when his father commanded the Carthaginian Army, led to a plan for the invasion of Italy by land across the Alps.

    The task was daunting to say the least. It involved the mobilization of between 60,000 and 100,000 troops (see Proctor, 1971) and the training of a war-elephant corps, All of them along the way had to be provisioned. The alpine invasion of Italy was a military operation that would shake the Mediterranean World of 218 BCE with repercussions for more than two decades.

  While the Romans expected the crossing, they had not anticipated such an early arrival.  His surprise entry is as one of the greatest military achievements in military logistics, as he crossed the Alps into hostile territory.  His surprise entry led to the termination of Rome’s main intended thrust, an invasion of Africa. 

The Po River Valley

  Hannibal arrived on the other side with at least 28,000 infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and 30 (?) elephants in the territory of the Taurinii, in what is now Piedmont northern Italy.  The Taurinii were an ancient Gallo-Ligurian people who occupied the upper valley of the Po River, in the center of modern Piedmont.  

  Hannibal's perilous march brought him into the Roman territory and frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out the main issue on foreign ground. What he had done was bring the fight to the Romans.   His sudden appearance among the Gauls of the Po Valley, moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from their new allegiance to the Romans before the latter could take steps to check the rebellion.  In 218 BCE, Hannibal attacked the Taurinii since his allies the Insubres had a long-standing feud with them.  Hannibal’s forces captured their chief town after a three-day siege.

   "The effect on the Roman Senate was shattering", wrote Livy (Livy XXI, 16).  "They knew they had never had to face a fiercer or more warlike foe... War was coming, and it would have to be fought on Roman soil, in defense of the walls of Rome, and against the world in arms." They passed a decree to raise six legions: 24,000 infantry with 1,800 cavalry and enlist 40,000 allied infantry and 4,400 cavalry. They had on hand 200 quinqueremes and 20 light ships. Then they called an assembly of all free Romans to vote on the question of war. For another point of view: (Polybius. "III.20". Histories.) :The Romans, when the news of the fall of Saguntum reached them, did not assuredly hold a debate on the question or war, as some allege.... For how could the Romans, who a year ago had announced to the Carthaginians that their entering the territory of Saguntum would be regarded as a "an act or event that provokes or is used to justify war,” now assemble to debate whether they should go to war or not? Even immediately after the events, the Romans did not have a clear and consistent understanding of what happened.  Tiberius Sempronius Longus a Consul had been given orders to take two legions to Sicily and wait there for orders to invade Carthage; Publius Cornelius Scipio  was given another four legions and tasked with attacking the Carthaginian forces in Iberia.'!-It was only when he was at Massilla, en-route to Iberia, that he became aware of Hannibal's army. After a failed interception, two legions of his army continued on to Iberia under his brother Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus - while Publius Cornelius Scipio himself the other Consul returned to Italy with two legions to take over the forces in the Po Valley where Rome was under threat from the Gallic tribes. 

  The aged but experienced Lucius Manlius was given the praetorship (Praetors at this time had the same power as Consuls) of two more legions to be kept in reserve in Cisalpine Gaul, where issues with the Gauls were beginning to develop.

  The Senate now sent a delegation of "all oldish men - Quintus Fabius, Marcus Livius, Lucius Aemilius, Gaius Licinius, and Quintus Baebius" with plenipotentiary powers: with the right to withhold or declare war on an ad hoc basis to Carthage. Having brought copies of past treaties they asked the Carthaginian Senate to determine if Hannibal had acted as an individual or with the approval of the Senate. The Carthaginians denied that Rome had a treaty with Carthage, pointing out that they had repudiated the Ebro Treaty, claiming that it was unratified, in order to make another with Saguntum, which had previously been defined as neutral.  After hours of study and debate, nothing could be resolved concerning Hannibal's legality. Fabius gathered a fold of his toga to his chest and offered it, saying, "Here, we bring you peace and war. Take which you will." The Carthaginians replied, "Whichever you please - we do not care." Fabius let the fold drop and proclaimed "We give you war." The senators shouted, "We accept it; and in the same spirit we will fight it to the end"(Livy XXI.18).  The Romans returned home.

  After taking the Taurini’s capitol city, Hannibal had to fight with reduced forces until his allies reached him. He was able to incite the rest of Gallia Cisalpine into revolt.  Shortly following this he encountered the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio, who Hannibal had evaded earlier in the Rhone Valley. 

The Ticinus Battleground

  In the ensuing Battle of Ticinus, cavalry forces of Hannibal’s army defeated the cavalry and light infantry of the Romans in a minor engagement. Scipio in the battle was severely injured and had to retreat across the river Trebia with his heavy infantry still intact, and encamped in the town of Placenta to await reinforcements.

The River Trebia

  

At this time, Hannibal was camped in the plain below Scipio's camp near Placentia. The exact place where Hannibal camped is unclear, but it is believed to have been southeast of Placentia, on the Nura. According to Theodore Ayrault Dodge, Hannibal apparently had two objectives in mind: to accept the friendly overtures of the Gallic tribes who dwelt in the northern foothills of the Apennines, and to prevent the two Roman consuls from joining forces.  With regards about the second objective, Dodge points out that Hannibal, astride the direct road from Ariminum was in a centrally occupied position that would prevent Sempronius from joining his forces with Scipio (Dodge, Theodore Ayrault (1891). "XIX. The Battle of the Trebia. December, 218 BCE.". Hannibal. Great Captains).

  Even before news of the defeat at the Ticinus River reached Rome, the Senate had ordered the consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus to bring his legions back from Sicily, where it had been preparing for the invasion of Africa to join Scipio and defeat Hannibal.  The latter was blocking  Sempronius’ way to Scipio’s army at first.  However, the Carthaginian capture of the supply depot at Clastidim, through treachery of the local Latin commander, served as a diversion and allowed Sempronius’ army to slip through to Scipio.    Despite Gallic willingness to supply Hannibal, he found that the size of his army was becoming a burden on the local communities resulting in a "daily increasing scarcity". The Romans had a grain storage depot at Clastidium (now Casteggio), which he was planning to attack. He must have bypassed it previously on his way to Placentia. Instead of attacking, he found that he could bribe the commander, Dasius Brundisius, whose name indicates he was not Roman but was from Brundisium, with 400 gold coins (Livy XXI.48).  The garrison surrendered and was treated with kindness, which suggests that good treatment was part of the deal, but none of the sources describes it in detail.  Clastidium was located on the right bank of the Po upstream from the Trebia. That Hannibal could operate there without hindrance indicates that he was in fact camped on the left bank of the Trebia and subsequent operations against the Gauls prove it further.

  After Hannibal’s defeat of Scipio at Ticinus the entire north of Italy, all the Gauls with the exception of one tribe joined the Carthaginian cause.  Soon the entire north of Italy was unofficially in revolt with both Gallic and Ligurian troops bolstering Hannibal’s army to at least 40,000 more men.

  After winning a completely unequal conflict against the Ligurians at Taurinii and the first legion-sized battle with the Romans at the river Ticinus, he had filled out his army with Gallic and other allies to the number of 90,000 men: 80,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, by the time of the Battle of Trebia. They were more than enough to be completely effective against the Romans; moreover, by that time Hannibal had turned all Gallia Cisalpina (the region in which the battle was fought) against the Romans, and the Carthaginians were prospering on enthusiastic Gallic supply and support as well.

  The Battle of the Trebia (or Trebbia) was the first major battle of the Second Punic War. Fought between the Carthaginian forces of Hannibal and the Roman Republic took place in December of 218 BCE, on or around the winter solstice. The battle took place in the flat country of the Province of Piacenza on the left bank of the Trebia River, a shallow, braided stream, and not far south from its confluence (from the south) with the Po River. 

  The two main sources on the battle are the History of Rome by Livy (Book XXI) and Histories of Polybius (Book III: 69-74). The two vary considerably in some of the geographical details and are ambiguous about some key points, especially whether the Romans were camped on the left bank or the right bank of the Trebia and in which direction they crossed the river. Reconstruction of the disposition is the major scholarly concern regarding the battle. The sources all agree on the outcome.

  The Roman Senate, appalled by the massacre of the Ligurians, had ordered the consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus, who was in Sicily, to reinforce the existing Roman general, Publius Cornelius Scipio. Unknown to them now, Scipio had been wounded during the Battle of Ticinus and had been driven into the hills south of Piacenza, then Placentia, a contemporary colony of the Romans (The Gauls had turned against Rome now in favor of Hannibal over this very issue of colonization). Scipio had no choice but to hold himself where he was, until Sempronius could reinforce him. At this time, Hannibal was camped in the plain below Scipio's camp near Placentia. 

The Apennines Mountains

  Finding himself blocked from reinforcement, Scipio became distressed. Moreover, he was concerned by a defection among the Gauls in his own camp, who killed a number of the Roman soldiers on guard duty. This defection, Scipio feared, was the signal of a more general insurrection, and he wished to keep his hold on the Ananes nearby, which was one of the few tribes in the vicinity that had remained loyal to Rome. This he thought he could do it by camping in their midst.  Leaving a small number of troops in camp to conceal his movement, Scipio decided to move the bulk of his forces across the Trebia, wading through the chilled winter waters of the stream amid snow and rain.  A detachment of Carthaginian cavalry discovered the Romans who sought to interrupt their march. The Romans, it is said, could scarcely lift their arms to defend themselves. Yet, while harassing the Romans, the Carthaginian cavalrymen turned aside to pillage Scipio's abandoned camp. This allowed Scipio to move his forces across the Trebia, where he took up and fortified a camp on the left bank.

    After receiving the orders of the Senate at Lilybaeum in Sicily, Sempronius had dismissed his men after taking their oaths to reassemble at Ariminum south of the Po River. From there, he probably marched along the route of the future Via Aemilia straight into Placentia. Sempronius' two legions assembled probably in early December, and Hannibal had ascertained at an early date that Sempronius was on his way to northern Italy. Hannibal’s army was located between the two consuls; he could have sought a general engagement with Scipio’s army before Sempronius arrived with his forces. Yet it appears that Hannibal did not wish to defeat his opponents in detail, and as shown by subsequent events, Sempronius managed to link up with Scipio’s army (though it remains unclear which route he used).  With regard to the problem of how Sempronius coming from Ariminum could have effected Livy's union with Scipio on the Trebia's left bank if Hannibal was on the right bank, Georg Niehbur discards the Ariminum passage and conjectures that Sempronius came through Liguria ( Niebuhr, Barthold Georg (1844). "Lecture LXI". Lectures on the History of Rome, from the First Punic War to the Death of Constantine II).  So he would come from behind Hannibal instead on from in front of him. Liguria is to the northwest and Ariminum would be to the southeast.  Regardless, it was not long before "Tiberius and his legions arrived and marched through the city” (Polybius III.68).  They did not stop there, probably because Hannibal's Numidian cavalry had not only  burned the Roman fort, but camped outside it to the south, at or near Hannibal's previous camp, some 40 days after they had left Sicily. Apparently, Hannibal crossed the Trebia in his pursuit of Scipio and camped on its left bank.

    For reasons unstated by either author, the Carthaginians suspected treachery from some of the Gauls located between the Trebia and the Po; that is, on the left bank of the Trebia, where his subsequent activity shows that Hannibal was certainly located (Livy XXI.52).  The authors make it clear that the Gauls hoped to stay on the good side of both commanders, but they do not give the details. Hannibal was incensed enough to dispatch 5,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry (Polybius says 2,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, III.69) to devastate their country, "district by district" and this action decided whose side they were to take. They appealed to the Romans.  The Consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus sent an unspecified number of cavalry across the river with 1,000 infantry. They caught the Carthaginians pillaging there and drove them into Hannibal's camp (clearly on the left bank). The Carthaginians acquired reinforcements and sallied out to push the Romans back across the river, where the Romans sent for reinforcements from their camp (proving a right-bank location) (Grundy, G.B. (1896). "The Trebia and Lake Trasimene").  Hannibal stopped the Carthaginian attack because this was not the time and place of his choosing, but it was happening spontaneously. The consul Tiberius Sempronius, however, concluded he had won a victory with his cavalry, with the same arms Scipio had been defeated.  On the other hand, Hannibal now knew that he could provoke Tiberius Sempronius and made plans to entice him across the river, where his troops would be defeated without assistance from the camp.

  The cavalry action of the preceding day had inspired the Romans with confidence. Sempronius resolved to seek "a decisive battle as soon as possible". The Senate had sent him to assist Scipio, but the latter was unable to do much, leaving Sempronius in an ambiguous situation. According to Polybius, Sempronius felt free to act on his own: "He was, it is true, at liberty to act as he thought best owing to the illness of Scipio” (Polybius III.70)  Nevertheless he felt obliged to argue it out with his colleague in heated language: "What good is there in further delay and waste of time? Where are the third consul and the third army we are waiting for? It is from their native soil, from the land in which they were born, that the Romans are to be driven” (Livy XXI.53).

    There is no mention at all of the camp at Ripa Alta or how Scipio would have gotten to the camp near Placentia; whether Sempronius had any authority to command Scipio’s men or not.  Wherever this consultation of consuls took place, Scipio advised, “that their legions would be all be better off with a winter’s drilling, and that the notoriously fickle Celts would not remain loyal to the Carthaginians... he advised Sempronius to let matters remain as they were” (Polybius III.70).   Sempronius decided to ignore Scipio and go ahead with the attack. The texts do not say that he kept Scipio informed.

  Since Livy is using 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry as the standard complement of a Roman legion, Scipio should have had 12,000 Roman infantry and 900 Roman cavalry plus at most 13,700 allied infantry and 1,000 cavalry. After losses suffered at Ticinus, Scipio should have had at most 27,000 men (Livy XXI.26).  Sempronius had two legions: 8,000 infantry and 600 cavalry, but he also had several thousand allies, about 16,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry (Livy XXI.17).  Scipio would have been the senior commander if active.  He also had the larger army.  Neither consul, however, could supersede the other without a decree from the Senate.  The numbers stated to have fought the battle are problematic.   Both authors agreed that the two consuls had sharp differences of opinion and that Sempronius acted as he thought right.  It is possible that the authors doubled the number of Roman legions fighting the battle and that Sempronius had only 8,000 or 9,000 Roman infantry. Sempronius apparently did have more than two legions. Scipio argues in the story that Sempronius' men needed the winter to train; suggesting that on the way to north Italy Sempronius may have raised two more legions of recruits, throwing them into battle under difficult physical circumstances against expert advice without training was not a good idea. There is no mention of any such events, however.

  Although Hannibal might have arrived at the Trebia with as many as 90,000 men, both sources agree (Livy & Polybius) that he fought the battle with 40,000 men: 20,000 Celtic, Spanish and African heavy-armed infantry, 10,000 cavalry, 8,000 Balearic slingers and spearmen plus another 1,000 in ambush. The ambush was the edge Hannibal intended to use to his advantage when it would turn the tide of battle into his favor.  He knew he would be fighting a large army.

  The December of 218 BCE, it was cold and snowy. Scipio was still recovering from his wounds but Sempronius was "impetuous and headstrong". Eager to come to blows with Hannibal before Scipio could recover and assume command– and especially as the time for the election of new consuls was drawing near–Sempronius took measures looking for a general engagement, disregarding Scipio's caution not to attack with untrained men (Livy XXI.53).   Unfortunately, for Sempronius, Hannibal was aware of this, and prepared a plan to take advantage of Sempronius' impetuosity. Hannibal's force camped across the cold and flooded Trebbia River (Polybius III.71.). Hannibal was relying on a network of Gallic spies to keep him informed of enemy activity. When they told him that the Romans were ready to do battle, he sent for 100 each of the best infantrymen and cavalrymen and had them select 10 each for a special mission. This detachment of 1,100 infantry and 1,100 cavalry under the command of Hannibal's younger brother, Mago, were given instructions to conceal themselves in the underbrush of the above-mentioned watercourse under the cover of night, and prepare an ambush for the Romans to be used in a surprise attack at the right moment (Livy XXI.53–54).

  On the following morning, Hannibal sent the rest of the Numidian cavalry beyond the Trebia to harass the nearby Roman camp and retreat, so as to lure the Romans into a position from which Mago's hidden detachment could strike at the opportune moment. They rode up to the gates and discharged missiles at the men on duty (Livy XXI.54).

   In response, Sempronius sent out the Roman cavalry to drive them off, and shortly afterwards sent out 6,000 javelin-throwers, the light-armed infantry, to cover the formation of the main line of battle behind them. These were the 12,000 Roman heavy-armed infantry.

  The day was raw; snow was falling; the Roman troops had not yet eaten their morning meal; yet, though they had been under arms for several hours, he pushed them across the fords of the Trebia, with the water breast-high and icy-cold. Arriving on the farther side, the Roman soldiers were so chilled that they could scarcely hold their weapons (Polybius III.72).

The Battle of Trebia 

  Hannibal was ready to receive them. His men had eaten, rubbed themselves with oil before their campfires, (Livy XXI.55) and prepared their weapons. He might have attacked the Roman army when half of it was across, with even greater chances of success. However, when he saw his ruse succeeding, he bethought him that he could produce a vastly greater moral effect on the new Gallic allies, as well as win a more decisive victory, by engaging the whole army on his own terms (Dodge, Theodore Ayrault (1891). "XIX. The Battle of the Trebia. December, 218 B.C.". Hannibal. Great Captains).

  Hannibal now put forward his 8,000 light infantry – javelin-throwers and Balearic slingers – as a covering skirmishing line, and behind them, he formed the main battle line of 20,000 infantry of Africans, Iberians, and Celts, with 10,000 cavalry and an unspecified number of elephants split between the two flanks (Livy XXI.55).

The Numidian cavalry wheeled suddenly and attacked the Roman cavalry, strung out in pursuit. Sempronius withdrew them to the flanks. The Numidians then harassed the Roman light infantry screen, or velites, causing them to expend all their missiles. As the armies approached, they were unable to be much of an impediment to the Carthaginians due to lack of ammunition and hypothermia, so Sempronius ordered them to fall back through the heavy infantry (Polybius III.72).  Similarly, when the Balearic slingers and javelin-throwers began to encounter Roman heavy infantry, Hannibal withdrew them and placed them on the wings.

  After the light-armed infantry (velites) retreated through the Roman line, the heavy-armed infantry (hastati and principes) closed with their Carthaginian counterparts. Concurrently the Carthaginian wings attacked the Roman wings, forcing them back to the river and leaving the infantry, whom they intended to protect, exposed (Polybius III.72–74, Livy XXI.55).

    Samuels suggests that in describing the Roman cavalry as being a withdrawal he is being tactful and a rout better describes what happened (Samuels, M. "The Reality of Cannae"). Seeing that the Roman rear had passed their position, Mago's hidden force emerged from the ambush and fell on the rear of the exposed hard-pressed Roman infantry. With their morale already sapped by cold, hunger and fatigue, the Romans on the sides and in the rear broke formation under this fresh onslaught and ran for the river.

  As the disorganized men were milling about the river, Hannibal used the opportunity to affect a massacre. The great majority of the casualties fell here or drowned in the river. The Roman cavalry escaped on horseback. As the Roman legionaries remained with Sempronius in the center and majority of the force were the 20,000 Romans, the men who died were probably not the core of the legionaries but were the Roman allies, who were yet untrained and untested in battle.

  It is clear from the odds and from subsequent events that Tiberius Sempronius intended a main attack on the center of the Carthaginian line. As he did not die on the flanks or in the rear, he must have been commanding the center in person. It would have included his most experienced and effective heavy infantry. In fact, they behaved as professional soldiers, (McDougall, Patrick Leonard, Lieutenant Colonel, Commandant of the Staff College (1858). The Campaigns of Hannibal) some of them quickly wheeling to fill in the sides and rear, forming a hollow square. In this standard Roman infantry formation, all sides faced outward leaving the center necessarily hollow, where the command post was and where the wounded were placed.

A Roman Legionnaire of the Republic

  This square soon deflected all Carthaginian attacks against it. The Carthaginians concentrated on the men by the river instead.  A light-infantry detachment deployed to stop the elephants. These they dealt with by volleying darts and jabbing under the tail. The elephants became wild, attacking both sides, until Hannibal ordered them driven off to the left to attack the Gauls fighting for Rome. Although he had made some unfortunate strategic decisions, Tiberius Sempronius proved himself a better battlefield general, (Dodge, Theodore Ayrault (1891). "XIX. The Battle of the Trebia. December, 218 BCE.". Hannibal. Great Captains.) ordering his men forward against the Carthaginian center as he intended The enemy there took great losses, although the authors do not say what they were. Of the two ethnic groups, Africans and Celts, the Celts lost the most men. The square soon found itself at the Carthaginian rear and looking back could see the Carthaginian army affecting a slaughter of allied troops. Tiberius Sempronius did not return to their assistance.  The sources offer his excuses of the river and the heavy rain. However, he marched his men into Piacenza, probably over a bridge that must have stood where the highway and railroad bridges now stand.
  The 10,000 veteran troops who did not break and run were the major survivors and they must have formed the hollow square. The authors make it clear that not many of the others made it to Piacenza, but some did. The others were massacred, as was Hannibal's custom. They appear to have been the mysterious extra legions – perhaps recruits – the cavalry and the auxiliaries. The casualties therefore were a maximum of 32,000 men, a rate of 76%. The rate was not at maximum, but the number who escaped is unknown. If it was half the number who fell back in good order, the rate would have been 64%, in either case a Roman disaster, but perhaps not quite the one depicted by the authors if Scipio's army was not involved. The Carthaginians did not cross the river to take Sempronius' camp. They might have been physically exhausted or concerned about the 10,000 or the army in the second camp on their flank could have deterred them.

  The next night, according to Livy, "the camp garrison and the other survivors, mainly wounded men, crossed the Trebia on rafts." Scipio was in command. He "marched his army in perfect quiet to Placentia, whence he crossed the Po to Cremona, that a single colony might be spared the burden of two armies in winter quarters"(Livy XXI.56).  

 Map of Cremona

 In the single-camp interpretation of this passage, Scipio must have crossed to the enemy side regardless of whether the camp was on the left or right bank. However, the narrative goes on to say that Hannibal did not cross the river to pursue them; thus, as previously, Scipio was placing the river between him and Hannibal. Following the thread of the previous narrative, Scipio must still have been in his camp at Ripa Alta. Some survivors managed to make their way upriver on the same side as the battle to Scipio's camp. Scipio broke camp at night, crossed the river and reached Placentia on the right bank, past Sempronius' now abandoned camp, or perhaps picking up the garrison left there along with additional survivors. He still had an army of such magnitude that it could not seek supplies in the same city.

  For a time, the Carthaginians did not attack the Romans, as the latter were now suffering from exposure. A cold snap had set in and the precipitation had turned from rain to snow and ice. All the elephants but one (or several in Polybius) died along with "many men and horses". When the news arrived at Rome that both consuls had been defeated at Ticinus and Trebbia, the population panicked, expecting to see Hannibal at the gates. Some wanted to move the capitol of Rome to a safer location (Livy XXI.57.)  In fact, the defeats were not the catastrophe they believed. Some 2.5 or more legions escaped from the battlefield, 3 more under Scipio never participated, while 2 more were in Spain; in all, the Senate still had 7.5 legions healthy and in good winter quarters.  The battle was a strategic victory for Hannibal but a tactical victory for the Romans.  This was because Hannibal's way to the south was wide open while it was possible that the Romans could have put an army on the field under the right leadership and could have defeated him.  So it was no clear cut victory for either side.

    What followed now were a series of small actions as the Carthaginians had recovered from the battle.  The first was at a Roman Calvary depot at Placentia, Emporium ("trading center"). However, the Romans drove them off wounding Hannibal. A few days later, the Carthaginians fell upon a Roman supply depot Vigevano that was just north of the probable site of the Battle of Ticinus. Scipio had not chosen to camp there but escaped instead to Placentia, perhaps because it was more secure (Prevas, John (2001). Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Invasion of Italy and the Punic Wars).  The depot was under guard by 35,000 allied troops who put up a disorganized resistance who then surrendered (Vigevano as Victumulae is just north of the probable site of the Battle of Ticinus (2001). Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Invasion of Italy).  For a time the "cold was intolerable (Livy XXI.58).  Nevertheless, as spring began to come on Hannibal resolved to attack Etruria following the Trebia southward.  In the Apennines, the army encountered a thunderstorm of such intensity that they could not pitch camp and when rain turned to hail and snow, they put the tents flat and crawled under them. A cold snap followed the storm. All the elephants except one, and many of the horses died (Polybius, Histories, Book III, 74).  After two days, Hannibal returned to the Placentia region and camped. Sempronius, in the last of his term as consul, determined to do battle, left Placentia and camped three miles from Hannibal.

Location of the Region of Placentia

    Hannibal was down to 12,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, perhaps not from casualties, more likely because his army, relying on Gallic allies, was seasonal. Marching the next morning to Tiberius Sempronius' camp, he was repelled by the Romans, who drove him back on his camp and then attacked it. Putting the bulk of his men in the center, Hannibal waited for the Romans to break in, but they never managed to do so. When they began to leave at the end of the day Hannibal sallied out in force to attack the Roman rear, hoping to effect a massacre. The fall of night prevented that event. Casualties were equal on both sides. This was the last military engagement of that consular year.

  Overall, the Romans suffered heavy losses with only 20,000 men out of 40,000 able to retreat to safety. They left Cisalpine Gaul in the aftermath. Having secured his position in northern Italy by this victory, Hannibal quartered his troops for the winter amongst the Gauls. The latter joined his army in large numbers, bringing it up to 60,000 men; however, their enthusiasm was somewhat reduced due to the Carthaginians living on their land.  This was just one more problem Hannibal would encounter in his efforts to make allies and keep them, because if they became his allies they would have to contribute to the war effort.  How they could do it posed more problems.

      The Roman Senate resolved to raise new armies against Hannibal under the recently   elected consuls of 217 BCE, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Gaius Flaminius Nepos. The latter had long distrusted his fellow senators and feared that they would try to sabotage his command by finding excuses to delay his departure. Therefore, he quietly left Rome to take over his army at Ariminum without performing the lengthy religious rituals required of an incoming consul (Livy. The History of Rome by Titus Livius: Books Nine to Twenty-Six, trans. D. Spillan and Cyrus Edmonds).  The Senate voted unanimously to recall him, but he ignored its orders. This caused widespread dismay among the Romans, who feared that Flaminius' disrespect for the gods would bring disaster on Rome. The Romans anticipated that Hannibal would advance into central Italy, Flaminius moved his army from Ariminum to Arretium, to cover the Apennine Mountain passes into Etruria. His colleague Servilius, who had performed the proper rituals who therefore was well behind Flaminius, replaced him with his freshly raised army at Ariminum to cover the route along the Adriatic coast. A third force, containing the survivors of previous engagements, was also stationed in Etruria under Scipio. Thus, both the eastern and western routes to Rome appeared guarded.